



PROFESSOR SHIELDS' COURSE.

FIRST PART.

THEMES AND QUESTIONS

FROM

Butler's Analogy.


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THE LOGIC APPLICABLE TO RELIGION.

(INTRODUCTION.)

PROBABILITY.

I. THE NATURE OF PROBABILITY.

1. *Probability distinguishable from Demonstration.*

How is probable evidence distinguished from demonstrative evidence?

Between what limits does it range?

What are the two reasons why one slight presumption does not constitute certainty?

2. *Probability susceptible of increase to Certainty.*

How may the slightest presumption amount to moral certainty?

What example is given?

II. THE FOUNDATION OF PROBABILITY.

1. *Probability founded upon Likelihood.*

What word expresses that which constitutes probability?

In what three ways may one truth or event be like another?

On what ground do we determine that an event will probably come to pass?

2. *Probability measured by Recurrence.*

By what are a presumption, an opinion, or a full conviction that an event will come to pass respectively produced?

What examples are given?

How is it shown that likelihood or analogy enters into our whole experience?

What incident illustrates the opposite conclusions which may be drawn from analogy?

III. THE VALUE OF PROBABILITY.

1. *Probability limited in its Information.*

Why does probable evidence afford only an imperfect kind of information?

To what kind of beings alone does it relate?

Why cannot it relate to the Infinite Intelligence?

But to us, what is Probability?

2. *Probability decisive in Speculation and Practice.*

What questions are described as properly admitting of probable evidence?

In matters of speculation what should be the effect of even the lowest favorable presumption?

In matters of practice what should be its force? and why?

In questions of great consequence what should be the effect of even a balance of probabilities?

How is this shown in the common actions of men?

RELIGIOUS ANALOGY.

I. ANALOGY IN GENERAL.

1. *The Philosophy of Analogy.*

What are the three topics relating to Probability which Butler declines further to examine?

What question relating to the formation of our presumptions, opinions, and convictions does he also waive?

2. *The Logic of Analogy.*

To what subject or science does reasoning from analogy belong?

On what grounds does Butler decline to treat of its rules?

3. *The Uses of Analogy.*

Notwithstanding any ignorance of the intellectual powers or the exercise of them, what weight actually has analogy?

What class of persons are most apt to object to it? and on what grounds?

What in general is the proper estimate of it?

What instance is given in which its force would be unquestioned?

II. ANALOGY, AS APPLIED TO RELIGION.

1. *Examples of Religious Analogy.*

How does Origen apply Analogy to the comparative difficulties of Nature and Scripture?

How may it likewise be applied to the question of the Divine Authorship of Nature and Scripture?

How far can analogy go in proving that they both have the same author?

2. *Grounds of Religious Analogy.*

How does it appear that the analogical method is practical?

To what extent, and in what proportion, is it conclusive?

What other reason is given for its introduction into the subject of religion?

What is presupposed or assumed in these reasonings? On what grounds is this assumption made?

What renders this assumption especially allowable?

III. THE SUPERIORITY OF RELIGIOUS ANALOGY.

1. *Analogy superior to mere Hypothesis.*

What was Des Cartes' method of reasoning upon the constitution and government of the world?

What other kindred method of reasoning upon such subjects is adduced and what example is given?

Wherein do these two methods differ and agree?

How is the analogical method distinguished from both these methods, as applied to the Divine government and the future state?

2. *Analogy superior to mere Speculation.*

In what speculations concerning the constitution of nature do another class indulge?

What may be said beforehand of the best speculations of the wisest men upon such a subject?

What three plans of nature might such a theorist imagine?

To what extravagant conclusions would such speculations lead in regard to happiness and virtue and the consistency of one with the other?

What is a full direct answer to them?

(1.) *The Precise Limits of Religious Speculation.*

What must be admitted as to our judgment of ends in general and of virtue and happiness as ends?

What consequently must we conclude to be the ultimate ends designed in Nature and Providence?

Why, however, are we incompetent to judge of the means necessary to such ends?

What are the *a fortiori* proofs of this incompetency afforded by the judgments of men concerning one another?

(2.) *The True Grounds of Religious Speculation.*

By what are we led to ascribe all moral perfection to God?

To whom, and why, is this a practical proof of His moral character?

How do we thence reach the above conclusion as to the true ends of Divine Providence?

(3.) *The greater Certainty of Religious Analogy.*

What now is recommended in place of such idle speculations?

To what other sure method of scientific investigation is this likened?

With what is it proposed to compare the known constitution of Nature and the acknowledged dispensation of Providence?

And what is anticipated as the result of this argument?

THE PROPOSED ANALOGY.

I. THE EXTENT AND FORCE OF THE PROPOSED ANALOGY.

What will be its extent and degree of exactness?

What will be its force in different instances?

What will it undeniably show in regard to the system of religion, both natural and revealed?

What class of objections will it almost entirely refute?

What class will it at least measurably refute?

What is the difference between these two classes of objections?

II. THE OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSED ANALOGY.

In what two departments may Religion or the Divine Government of the world be considered?

1. *The Argument for Natural Religion.*

(1.) What will be proved as to a Future State?

(2.) What will be proved as to the destinies of men in that state?

(3.) What will be proved as to the Divine Government in the future state?

(4.) What, as to the relation of the present state to the future state?

(5.) What, as to the design of the present probation?

(6.) What speculative objections from the constitution of Nature will be refuted?

(7.) What speculative objections from the Divine Attributes will be refuted?

2. *The Argument for Revealed Religion.*

(1.) What will be proved as to the occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence?

(2.) What, as to the character of its evidences?

(3.) What, as to our pre-conceptions of its contents?

(4.) What, as to its structure or scheme?

(5.) What, as to the agency by which it is carried on?

(6.) What, as to the prevalence and clearness of its evidence?

(7.) What, as to the evidence itself?

III. THE DESIGN OF THE PROPOSED ANALOGY.

What is it designed to show in respect to the things principally objected against in this scheme of Natural and Revealed Religion?

What, as to the chief objections themselves alleged against it?

And what, as to the weight and validity of this whole argument from analogy?

With what article of religion is it proposed to begin? and for what reason?

THE PROBLEMS OF NATURAL RELIGION,
AS SOLVED BY ANALOGY.

(PART I.)

PRELIMINARY.

AS TO THE RELIGIOUS CAPACITIES. (Appendix.)

THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY IN A FUTURE STATE.
(Dissertation I.)

THE QUESTION OF A MORAL FACULTY IN MAN. (Dissertation II.)

SECTION I.

AS TO THE SYSTEM OF NATURAL RELIGION. (Chaps. I—V.)

THE PROBABILITY OF A FUTURE LIFE. (Chap. I.)

THE PROBABILITY OF A DIVINE GOVERNMENT. (Chap. II.)

THE PROBABILITY OF A FUTURE PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT. (Chap. III.)

THE PROBABILITY OF A PRESENT STATE OF PROBATION. (Chap. IV.)

THE PROBABILITY OF A MORAL EDUCATION FOR THE FUTURE LIFE. (Chap. V.)

SECTION II.

AS TO THE EVIDENCE OF ~~REVEALED~~ ^{NATURAL} RELIGION.

Chaps. V—VII.

THE FATALISTIC OBJECTIONS AGAINST RELIGION. (Chap. VI.)

THE MORAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST RELIGION. (Chap. VII.)

THE PROBLEMS OF REVEALED RELIGION,

AS SOLVED BY ANALOGY.

(PART II.)

SECTION I.

AS TO THE SYSTEM OF REVEALED RELIGION. (Chaps. I—V.)

THE PRESUMPTIVE IMPORTANCE OF REVEALED RELIGION.
(Chap. I.)

THE PROBABILITY OF A MIRACULOUS REVELATION. (Chap. II.)

THE PROBABILITY OF A PARADOXICAL REVELATION. (Chap. III.)

THE PROBABLE WISDOM AND GOODNESS OF A REVEALED SYSTEM. (Chap. IV.)

THE PROBABILITY OF THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM OF REDEMPTION. (Chap. V.)

SECTION II.

AS TO THE EVIDENCES OF REVEALED RELIGION.

(Chaps. VI, VIII.)

THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES.
(Chap. VI.)

THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES ANALOGICALLY ESTIMATED. (Chap. VII.)

THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. (Chap. VIII.)

THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.

AS PRELIMINARY TO THAT OF A FUTURE LIFE.

(DISSERTATION I. APPENDIX.)

To what extent is the question of a future life important and intelligible?
How has it been perplexed by the question of personal identity? And how are such difficulties to be estimated?

PERSONAL IDENTITY MORE READILY ASCERTAINED THAN DEFINED.

How should attempts to define personal identity be regarded?

1. *The Idea, simple and spontaneous.*

To what other simple ideas may it be likened? and what illustrations show how these ideas immediately arise to the mind?

2. *The Fact, a matter of consciousness or reflection.*

What corresponding facts do these illustrations show?

And how is the fact, as well as the idea of personal identity ascertained?

How is this otherwise described as due to reflection?

I. THE NEGATIVE DEFINITION.

1. *Personal Identity distinguishable from Consciousness.*

Why is not consciousness necessary to personal identity?

What renders this self-evident, and to what is it analogous?

How may the singular mistake of confounding consciousness with identity have arisen?

How is this mistake exposed by distinguishing between present consciousness and past conduct?

1. *Personal Identity distinguishable from Organization.*

What are the two reasons why the question of personal identity is to be distinguished from that of other organized substances, such as vegetables?

(1.) *Sameness of Organization, the loose popular sense of identity.*

When a man swears to the identity of a tree, in what sense does he use the word *same*?

Can such identity of organization consist with change of particles?

(2.) *Sameness of Substance, the strict philosophical sense of Identity.*

Why cannot a man swear to the identity of a tree in a strict, philosophical sense?

Why cannot such identity of substance consist either with change of particles or properties?

What now is the difference between the popular and the philosophical sense of identity, and why cannot personal identity subsist with diversity of substance as well as of organization?

II. THE POSITIVE DEFINITION.

1. *Identity in general consists in sameness of substance or being.*

How is the question accurately stated by Locke?

2. *Personal Identity consists in the sameness of a rational being.*

What is Locke's own definition of person, and consequently of personal identity?

Why does the question, Whether the same rational being is the same substance, need no answer?

1st Objection, That consciousness of one's existence in different periods implies different consciousnesses.

What is said to be the ground of the doubt, whether the same person be the same substance?

How is this refuted by the analogy of different perceptions of the same object?

2d Objection, That different consciousnesses (or states of consciousness) imply different personalities.

What extreme views of personality are taken by some of Locke's followers?

Upon their theory, why is it immaterial whether our substance is continually changing or not?

What absurd consequences flow from their theory?

And why are such consequences legitimately deducible?

How might they seek to evade those conclusions?

By what abuse of language do they confuse the question, but what must they consistently mean?

What is then the best confutation of their notion?

(1.) *This notion opposed to all experience.*

How is it shown to be opposed to all our natural convictions and daily experience?

How far is it possible to act upon it?

In what light would it appear, if applied to temporal concerns?

To what then must any perverse application of it to a future life be attributed?

(2.) *This notion opposed to the very definition of an intelligent being.*

What distinction is made between an idea or quality and a being?

What must be confessed as to all beings during their whole existence?

How is this shown to be true of all living beings?

(3.) *This notion nullified by consciousness itself.*

How does consciousness, by the memory of former actions, assure us of our personal identity?

Whence arises the most absolute assurance of an action having been done?

If a person be regarded as a substance, what does consciousness testify?

If a person be regarded as the property of a substance, why does consciousness still testify to the identity of that substance?

Objection. That our consciousness or memory of personal identity may possibly deceive us.

Why might this objection be raised at the end of any demonstration whatever?

What other kinds of perception would it equally invalidate?

How is the absurdity of the objection shown?

THE PROBABILITY OF A FUTURE LIFE.

(CHAP. I.)

To what is the present argument restricted, and what is the question to be proved?

I. THE PRESUMPTION FROM THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT IN FAVOR OF A FUTURE LIFE.

What do we find to be a general law of nature in our own species?

How do we ascertain the existence of this law?

How is this law illustrated in other creatures, in worms, birds, and insects?

To what extent are instances of it afforded?

How does it establish the probability of a future life?

II. THE PRESUMPTION FROM THE LAW OF CONTINUANCE.

With what powers or capacities do we find ourselves now endowed?

What is the presumption from having these powers before death?

What is the degree of this presumption, and what alone could remove it?

1. *This Presumption founded upon all experience.*

Upon what general result of our experience is it founded?

What word expresses this kind of presumption, and how does it appear that we act upon it in regard to the whole course of the world, or indeed any existing substance?

If men were assured that death would not destroy their living powers, what would they inevitably conclude?

How does this state of the question show the high probability of a future life?

2. *No Rational Presumption to the contrary.*

What must be acknowledged, prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life?

Yet, even prior to these proofs, what must still be maintained?

On what two grounds alone can the apprehension of annihilation at death be argued?

(1.) NO ADVERSE PRESUMPTION FROM THE REASON OF THE THING.

Why cannot we argue the destruction of living agents from the nature or effects of death?

Why cannot we argue it from the manner in which our living powers exist or are exercised?

What does sleep, or a swoon, demonstrate as to the existence of these powers, the capacity of exercising them, as well as the actual exercise of them?

How then does our ignorance concerning them show that there can be no rational probability that death will destroy them?

And what is the effect of the argument from the reason of the thing, upon the question?

(2.) NO ADVERSE PRESUMPTION FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE.

What is the effect of the whole analogy of nature upon the question?

Why cannot we reason as to what becomes of the living powers of animals after death?

What is the only visible bearing of that event upon them?

What alone is destroyed by that event in respect to them?

What positive probability is afforded by our knowledge of them as far as it can extend?

How is this probability confirmed and made credible by our own experience and observation?

3. *Only Imaginary Presumptions to the contrary.*

How is the imagination prone to influence the reason in this case?

How has this influence been aggravated?

How is that faculty characterized?

Into what kind of conceptions does it mislead us?

Whence do the imaginary presumptions that death will be our destruction arise?

And what will the consideration of them show?

(I.) THE IMAGINARY PRESUMPTION THAT DEATH WILL BE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WHOLE LIVING BEING.

Upon what supposition must this presumption proceed?

(1.) *This Presumption unsupported by Consciousness.*

(a.) *The Divisibility of Self utterly inconceivable.*

How does Consciousness attest the indivisibility of Self?

What illustration is employed to show the indivisibility of consciousness and consequent indivisibility of the living being?

(b.) *The Absolute Oneness of Self perfectly Conceivable.*

Is it any more difficult to conceive the supposition just proved than the reverse?

That supposition being proved, what follows as to our organized bodies?

By what analogy is this absolute oneness of self, as contrasted with the dissoluble body, shown to be perfectly conceivable?

By what imaginary cases of past or future bodies, successively animated, is this shown to be perfectly conceivable?

And how is it shown that the dissolution of such bodies would have no conceivable tendency to destroy the living agent who animated them?

(2.) *This Presumption unsupported by Experience.*

Why cannot the absolute oneness of self be proved properly by experimental observations?

How then do they bear upon the supposition?

What question, however, relative to the living substance, do they leave undetermined?

What does experience show as to the loss of limbs, organs, and even the greater part of the body by the living agent?

What does it also show as to the bulk of the body at different periods of life?

And what is certain as to the state of the particles in all animal bodies?

What unavoidable distinction are we taught by such observations, and how do they affect the question of personal identity?

(a.) *No Experimental Evidence that Death could dissolve the whole body of a Living Agent.*

Why cannot we determine what is the certain bulk of the living agent or self?

And yet, what must be determined as to its bulk before we can prove it dissoluble by death?

Why may the elementary particles or material germ of the body survive the event of death?

How does this argument affect the general question of the absolute indissolubility of self?

(b.) *No Experimental Evidence that the Dissolution of the whole body would be the destruction of the Living Agent.*

From our having already lost certain systems of matter, in which we have been interested, without losing our identity, what follows as to any other (internal) systems of matter?

What is the ground of this inference respecting them, and what must we conclude as to any effect of death upon them?

From our having already several times over lost the greater part or the whole of the body, without losing our identity, what follows as to the effect of death upon ourselves?

By what analogous means in both cases is the loss effected?

1st Objection. That the alienation of matter at death is sudden rather than gradual as in life.

How may this objection be answered from our present experience?

2d Objection. That the matter alienated at death is original rather than adventitious as in life.

What is the first answer to this objection from our present experience?

If this be not admitted, what answer then remains?

What is to be maintained as to the relation of such adventitious matter to the living agent?

And yet what does the relation itself amount to?

In what respect alone does it differ from that subsisting between the living agent and all foreign matter?

How far do these observations nullify the imaginary presumption that the dissolution of the body would be the destruction of the living agent?

(c.) *No Experimental Evidence that the Dissolution of the present Physical Organism would be the Destruction of the Living Agent.*

In what light is it proposed next to consider the body?

1st. Organs of Perception.

By what experiments and observations can it be shown that our eyes are mere instruments of perception?

How may the same thing be shown in respect to the sense of feeling or hearing?

How are such artificial contrivances and the bodily organs shown to be analogous in their relation to the perceiving agent?

How are they shown to be analogous in their relation to external objects?

Between what sense and what mechanical contrivance is this analogy most evident?

What may thence be inferred respecting the other senses?

In the above comparison, what is acknowledged and what alone is maintained concerning the apparatus of perception?

How is this view confirmed experimentally by the loss of the senses?

How is it also confirmed by the experience of dreams?

2d. Instruments of Motion or Volition.

How is it shown from experience that the limbs are mere instruments of voluntary motion by the living agent?

What artificial contrivances illustrate their relation to the living agent?

How is the analogy between such artificial and bodily instruments of motion heightened by what appears in the mechanism of the latter?

What illustration is used to show that both the senses and the limbs are mere instruments of perception and volition?

In what respect alone does our relation to them differ from our relation to other foreign matter, such as a microscope or staff?

And what may be inferred as to the effect of their alienation or dissolution upon the perceiving and moving agent?

Objection. That the Argument is equally applicable to Brutes.

What insuperable difficulty is thought to arise from the application of this argument to brutes?

1st. *The Objection invidious on moral grounds.*

What invidious thing is designed in the objection to the natural immortality of brutes?

If this thing were really implied in it, why would it be no difficulty?

(1.) *The Analogy between the Infancy of Men and Animals.*

Prior to experience, what presumption would hold equally in regard to men and brutes?

What is the ground of this presumption?

(2.) *The Law of the Development of Religious animals.*

What do we find to be a general law of nature in regard to creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion?

Under this law what portion of the human species go out of the world on a par with the animals?

2d. *The Objection also weak on natural grounds.*

What false assumption is involved in the objection to the natural immortality of brutes?

What is conceivable as to the destiny of animals?

In what light are our difficulties as to their destiny to be estimated?

What is the force and extent of the objection under consideration?

And how far is it applicable to the proofs more peculiar to mankind?

(II.) THE IMAGINARY PRESUMPTION THAT DEATH WILL DESTROY THE POWERS OF REFLECTION AS WELL AS OF SENSATION.

What are named as our present powers of reflection?

How do they differ from the powers of sensation in their relation to the body, and what is to be thence inferred as to the effect of its dissolution upon them?

(1.) *This Presumption nullified by our Experience in the Reflective State.*

What is said of the two states in which human creatures at present exist?

When may we be said to live in a state of sensation? and when in a state of reflection?

In this state of reflection, is the body necessary to the living being?

How far are the senses necessary to the reflecting powers, and to what are they likened?

After ideas are gained, what are our reflective capacities? and how are they related to the senses and to the whole body?

What then is the argument against the imaginary presumption of their destruction by death?

(2.) *This Presumption nullified by our Observation of Mortal Diseases.*

In some mortal diseases, what proof is afforded of the independence of the intellectual powers?

How can the previous reasoning as to the living (physical) powers be here applied to the reflecting (intellectual) powers?

What then is the proper argumentative force of instances of mortal diseases in which the intellectual powers are not affected or impaired?

How is this shown *a fortiori*, by comparing the effects of sleep with those of disease?

What are the evidences in mortal diseases that the intellectual powers are not impaired? and what do they prove as to the vigor of life?

How is this especially shown in a progressive mortal disease?

Does the same reasoning apply to death by any other means than disease?

(III.) THE IMAGINARY PRESUMPTION THAT DEATH WILL EVEN SUSPEND THE EXERCISE OF THE REFLECTING POWERS.

How may the argument be carried forward so as to nullify this presumption?

(1.) *This Presumption nullified by the very Idea of Death?*

How does its intrinsic absurdity appear from the very idea of death?

What experience and observation suggest the contrary expectation?

How then may our posthumous life be related to our present life?

(2.) *This Presumption nullified by an analogy between Death and Birth.*

In what respect may death answer to our birth?

Into what kind of a state may death, like birth, immediately introduce us?

What renders us capable of existing in our present state of sensation, and what may be the only natural hinderance to our existing immediately in a higher state of reflection?

(3.) *This Presumption nullified by our Ignorance of the State after Death.*

Why cannot we be sure that Death will suspend all our powers?

If we were sure, why could not we argue their destruction from their suspension?

Objection. That this whole argument may be overthrown by an analogy between the death of men and plants.

What shadow of an analogy remains to favor the imaginary presumptions we have been considering?

How does this likeness serve the purposes of the poets?

But how is it shown to be wholly irrelevant to the present question?

In place of these imaginary presumptions and fanciful analogies, what have been laid down as the proper premises from which to argue, and what will thence be concluded?

What now is the scope of the whole previous argument and the general conclusion from it?

1st Inference. THE PROBABLE NATURAL SEQUENCE AND CHARACTER OF THE FUTURE STATE.

To what extent may our entrance into another world be natural?

What may the character of the new state naturally be to the individuals entering it?

And how may its advantages naturally be bestowed?

Objection. That the Future State may be more Divine than the Present State.

In what respect may the bestowment of the advantages differ from that in the present state?

(1.) *The Objection, fully conceded, would not prove the Future State to be unnatural.*

Even allowing the common vague sense of the word natural, how could the absurdity of the objection be shown?

In connection with what reasoning does it appear especially absurd? and why?

(2.) *The Objection proceeds upon a false apprehension of the word NATURAL.*

What is the only distinct meaning of the word *Natural*?

Why does what is natural imply an Intelligent Agent as much as what is supernatural?

In what proportion, then, will persons' notion of what is natural be enlarged?

To what extent may this expanded view of the natural exist in some beings in the universe?

2d Inference. THE CREDIBILITY OF A FUTURE LIFE.

What is the defect and what the true value of this probable evidence of a Future Life?

Why would not a demonstrative proof of it serve any better purpose with an atheist?

Why then is the question of any importance to religion?

And what is the value and relevancy of the foregoing argument?

THE PROBABILITY OF A DIVINE GOVERNMENT IN THE FUTURE STATE.

(CHAP. II.)

What makes the question of a Future Life so important ?

What supposition makes the consideration of it so important ?

Without this supposition, how much interest might we have in it ?

But if there is ground for this supposition, what will be the effect upon reasonable men ?

What should be the effect, even though the proof of a future life and interest were only presumptive ?

I. GENERAL ANALOGY BETWEEN THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

1. *The Fact of a Divine Government in the Present State.*

How does it appear that the Author of Nature has put our own happiness or misery in our own power ?

How does experience teach us that He does not even preserve our lives without our own agency ?

In general, by what means does He secure to us our enjoyments ?

How is it shown that our miseries also greatly depend upon ourselves ?

What exceptions to this general course of things may be allowed ?

1st Objection. But this view seems inconsistent with our Ideas of Human Happiness.

What irrelevant question concerning this constitution of nature by its Author may here be raised ?

What may be the reason why creatures were not made promiscuously or necessarily happy ?

Were they made happy by such a method, what might be the result ?

What class alone may the Divine Goodness be disposed to make happy ?

What other pleasure besides the happiness of His creatures might be peculiar to an Infinitely Perfect Mind ?

How great may be our ignorance of the present Divine government?

What certain fact, however, remains in respect to the general method of that Divine government?

2d Objection. That this view seems inconsistent with the Uniformity of Nature.

To what may the foreseen pains and pleasures of actions be directly ascribed?

What is conceded and what is maintained in regard to this objection?

How is its absurdity shown as applied to the general course of nature?

In particular, how is it shown that the uniform, natural consequences of our actions are but Divine appointments?

And what Divine purpose is served by our natural foresight of these consequences?

3d Objection. That this view seems inconsistent with the interests of Morality.

What wrong inference may be suggested as to the design of our passions?

How is the absurdity of this inference illustrated?

2. The Rewards and Punishments of the Present Divine government.

From what two premises is it concluded that we are now actually under a Divine government of rewards and punishments?

Upon what supposition does this conclusion proceed? and does it ensue as a deduction of reason or as a matter of experience?

Why is this Divine government as real as any civil government?

1st Objection. That the Divine Agency in natural Rewards and Punishments is not immediate.

What two views may be taken as to the Divine Agency in our pains and pleasures?

Why is it necessary to decide between them?

How is the comparative perfection of the Divine government illustrated by this very objection?

2d Objection. That the Divine Agency in the lesser natural Punishments would appear absurd.

How will some persons be disposed to treat the idea of Divine agency in our lesser pains?

How is it shown that this cannot be evaded without denying all final causes?

And what illustration is given?

3. The Consequent Probability of a similar Divine government in a Future State.

What then is the true conception of the Author of Nature, even prior to the consideration of His Moral attributes?

What is our actual, experienced relation to Him, and to what other natural relations is it likened?

What is the general doctrine of religion concerning a future state?

What objection to this doctrine does the whole analogy of nature refute, and how does it show the doctrine to be credible?

II. SPECIAL ANALOGY BETWEEN PRESENT AND FUTURE PUNISHMENTS.

Why is it proper to dwell upon this analogy?

How are natural punishments described? And how are they distinguished from mere miseries?

1. *Particulars of this Analogy.*

(1.) *The Punishment in both cases is consequent upon Pleasurable Actions.*

What instances are given of natural punishments consequent upon actions attended with present advantage or pleasure?

(2.) *The Punishment in both cases is disproportionate to the Previous Pleasure.*

What proportion exists between many punishments and the pleasure or advantage of the actions from which they flow?

(3.) *The Punishment often long-delayed.*

How does the very constitution of nature show that the delay of a natural punishment is no presumption of impunity?

(4.) *The Punishment sometimes suddenly inflicted.*

How do such long-delayed punishments at length fall?

(5.) *The Punishment seldom fully anticipated.*

By what examples is it shown that they are seldom fully, and sometimes not at all, anticipated?

(6.) *The Punishment, when incurred, inevitable.*

What examples show that neglected opportunities can never be recalled?

(7.) *The Punishment at length irremediable.*

How is it shown that, in the course of nature, after a certain limit, neither reformation nor repentance can prevent punishment?

(8.) *The Punishment sometimes due to mere neglect.*

How do the punishments of mere inconsiderateness sometimes compare with those of active misconduct?

(9.) *The Punishment in some cases final and summary.*

What examples are given and why are they to be included in this estimate?

Are such natural punishments as are enumerated above occasional?

How do they arise under the natural government of God?

2. *Completeness of this Analogy.*

What conclusive proof have we that the foregoing description of present

natural punishment applies in every particular to those future punishments of which religion warns us?

What passage of Scripture thus shows the perfection of this analogy?

What does this analogy add to the proper proof of future punishments?

How is it shown that such examples of natural punishments thus add to the proper proof of future punishments?

3. *Value of this Analogy.*

What is acknowledged and what is maintained in this argument?

What two things is it sufficient to prove?

What speculative objections does it answer?

How is it adapted to affect even serious minds?

To what other class in the present age is it especially adapted?

How does it show that even upon the most skeptical principles there is no ground for their feeling?

THE QUESTION OF A MORAL FACULTY, AS PRELIMINARY TO THAT OF A MORAL GOVERNMENT.

(DISSERTATION II. APPENDIX.)

What renders beings capable of moral government?

What have we in common with brute creatures, and what in distinction from them?

I. EVIDENCES OF THE MORAL FACULTY.

1. *Its Existence.*

How do we ascertain the existence of this faculty?

How does it appear in our judgment of characters?

What words, qualifying actions or characters, indicate it?

What class of treatises indicates it? and why?

How is it implied in our natural sense of gratitude?

How is it implied in the distinction between mere injury and harm, and between injury and just punishment?

2. *Its Universality.*

To what extent do men speak and act on the supposition of this moral faculty?

What different terms are applied to it?

Is it a sentiment of the understanding or a perception of the heart?

What proves the universality of virtue, notwithstanding disputes about its nature?

What are the evidences of a universally acknowledged standard of virtue? And what particular virtues are embodied in it?

II. OBJECTS OF THE MORAL FACULTY.

What are the objects of this faculty?

What kind of principles are also included?

What is character?

How do brutes differ from men in their actions?

To what other kind of discernment is this moral discernment of actions analogous?

How does it appear that it is exercised independently of the actual or intended consequences of actions?

How is it also shown in our estimate of characters?

And how is it shown in our moral approbation or disapprobation of ourselves and others?

III. PERCEPTIONS OF THE MORAL FACULTY.

1. *Perception of Good or Ill Desert of Actions.*

What is implied in our discernment of actions as morally good or evil?

How far can this perception be explained? And what shows it to be real and general?

What illustration is used to show that we do not understand by the ill-desert of actions merely that the good of society requires the punishment of the doer?

Are innocence and ill-desert consistent ideas?

What does ill-desert presuppose, and how are the two ideas connected in our minds?

How is this illustrated by our perception of ill-desert in a sufferer?

On viewing together the notions of vice and misery, what third notion results, and what association of ideas thus arises in the mind?

How is this association of ideas to be regarded?

2. *Perception of Good and Ill-desert in some cases apparently disproportioned to Virtue and Vice.*

Why is the perception of good desert weak with respect to common instances of virtue?

What is the effect of a very weak regard to virtue in such instances?

Why is our perception of ill-desert in vicious actions lessened by the thought of great temptations inducing them?

Why would we judge differently between the case of a man overcome by tortures or by a common temptation?

3. *Perception of Good and Ill Desert the result of a comparison of actions with their agents.*

What does our perception of vice and ill-desert arise and result from?

How is this proved in the case of a mere neglect of duty?

What illustrations prove the same in the case of positive vices?

Does this difference between the same actions by different agents arise from a difference in their intentions?

From whence does it arise, and how is it ascertained?

What epithets are used to express this difference?

IV. THE SCOPE OF THE MORAL FACULTY.

1. *Prudence a Species of Virtue.*

What moral question arises in regard to our own interest as well as that of others?

What is prudence?

Why is prudence of the nature of virtue?

How is it distinguished from mere desire of our own or others' happiness?

Objection. That our disapprobation of imprudence is not so sensible as of falsehood, injustice, or cruelty.

Why may such a sensible disapprobation of imprudence be less necessary?

Why does it less need the additional punishments inflicted upon injustice or fraud?

How does compassion lessen our indignation against it?

But in greater instances of imprudence, how do men judge themselves and others?

What particular examples are given?

What is meant by *folly*, and why is the word applicable only to human creatures?

If it should be granted that the words *virtue* and *vice* are not strictly applicable to prudence and folly, what must still be maintained in regard to them?

What objection against religion is met by this view of prudence?

2. *Benevolence not the whole of Virtue.*

What question in regard to the relation of virtue to benevolence is waived, and what is the point insisted upon?

(1.) *The Theory of General Benevolence opposed to our Moral Constitution.*

Were benevolence the whole of virtue, how would we then judge of our own and others' character?

On what account alone would we then disapprove injustice and falsehood?

What illustration, however shows that one might act benevolently and yet not virtuously?

And what illustration shows that one might act virtuously and yet not benevolently?

What absurd consequences, furthermore, to personal morality would flow from such a theory?

What, then, is the actual constitution of our nature in regard to this matter?

Objection. That Benevolence may be the whole of the Divine Character?

Were this His character, is it in fact ours?

On the supposition of such a Divine character, why were we not endowed with the same character?

Taking, then, our constitution as we find it, how must we estimate falsehood, violence, and injustice as well as benevolence?

(2.) *The Theory of General Benevolence pernicious and visionary.*

How have some distinguished advocates of this theory expressed themselves?

What terrible mistakes might arise from it?

Whose concern is the happiness of the world, and in what way alone are we called upon to promote it?

How are supposed endeavors to do good, without regard to veracity and justice, to be estimated?

Within what limits is general benevolence confessedly a duty?

What practical difficulties, however, attend it?

And what are the considerations which alone make it a duty?

Objection. That the rule of veracity is not invariable.

What apparent exception to the obligation of veracity is conceded?

In general, what constitutes falsehood?

Why may a man even be obliged to do what he foresees will deceive?

CONCLUSION. On the supposition of such a Moral Faculty in human creatures, in what must the moral government of them consist?

THE PROBABILITY OF A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE FUTURE STATE.

(CHAP. III.)

I. THE CHARACTER OF GOD'S MORAL GOVERNMENT.

1. *As distinguished from God's Natural Government.*

What is the proof of an Intelligent Maker of the world ?

What is the corresponding proof of an Intelligent Governor of the world ?

What kind of creatures are the subjects of such government ?

What kind of authority is implied in such government ?

Does this certainly prove a moral as well as natural government of the world ?

How is moral distinguished from natural government ?

In what does the perfection of moral government consist ?

2. *As Righteous rather than simply Benevolent.*

What is simple absolute benevolence ?

What would veracity and justice become in such a character ?

Why ought not this to be asserted unless it can clearly be proved ?

What is the practical question to be considered ?

Why is it supposable that the Author of Nature may manifest himself to some other creatures as simply and absolutely benevolent ?

What, however, is the character under which He actually manifests himself to us ?

What proof of this has He given us ?

What proofs may He also have given that His government is righteous or moral ?

What is the proper force of such proofs ?

3. *As still incomplete, though actually begun.*

What is expressly allowed in regard to the present Divine government?
 Why does not this hinder it from having somewhat of a moral element?
 What may be the reason its perfection cannot now appear?
 What is included in the proposed argument?

II. THE RUDIMENTS OF GOD'S MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE PRESENT STATE.

1ST PRELIMINARY PROOF. *The Probable Surplus of Happiness on the side of Virtue.*

What would be the peculiar force of this argument?

What acknowledged difficulty would attend it?

What makes it possible that there may be exceptions to the happiness of virtue even among the blameless?

And why much more among persons reformed or reforming?

In what respects may the reformed seem even less happy than the obdurate?

Is such unhappiness due to former vices or to the consequences of reformation?

Upon the whole, what is the proper conclusion as to the relative happiness of virtue and vice?

If it were otherwise, what proof still remains?

2D PRELIMINARY PROOF. *The Presumptive Adaptations of God's Natural Government.*

If there were no natural government, could there be any moral government?

What is presumable from the certain fact of God's natural government?

According to what rule is it most presumable that God would reward and punish men?

Why, according to this rule rather than any other?

Why cannot the doctrine of moral rewards and punishments possibly be regarded as absurd or chimerical?

1. THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCES OF PRUDENCE AND RASHNESS.

What are the natural consequences of prudence and imprudence respectively?

How is it shown that these are instances of a right constitution of nature?

Why does the rewarding and punishing of prudence and rashness imply a moral government?

2. THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCES OF BENEFICIAL AND MISCHIEVOUS ACTIONS.

On what ground are vicious actions punished in society?

Besides their legal punishment, what other penalties do they bring with them?

How does Nature declare against them?

What vices are named as destructive of the very being of society?

How does the punishment of such crimes prove a moral government, naturally established and in action?

How is it shown that this moral government, though natural and human, is also divine or providential, and that men are accountable under it?

Objection. That good and beneficial actions are sometimes punished, or ill and mischievous actions rewarded.

What is the first answer to this objection?

What is the second answer to it?

How far, then, is it true that the Author of Nature has directed and necessitated mankind to punish vicious actions?

3. THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCES OF VIRTUE AND VICE AS SUCH.

Of what kind of moral government do these afford instances?

What preliminary distinction must be made between actions and their qualities or between the results of actions and the results of their qualities?

What, in general, are the respective results of virtuousness and viciousness?

(I.) *Internal Consequences.*

(1.) What immediate effects are first mentioned?

With what inward feeling is vice attended?

Through what degrees does this feeling range, and from what other feeling is it distinguished?

How is this distinction illustrated by the common language of men?

With what inward feelings is virtue attended?

What special virtues are named as attended with such feelings?

(2.) Why should the hopes and fears of a future life be included among the inward effects of virtue and vice?

How is it intimated that they are of the nature of moral rewards and punishments?

(II.) *External Consequences.*

(1.) What social consequences attend virtue and vice respectively?

How is it shown that men do this on moral grounds?

(2.) What public consequences of virtue and vice are instanced?

How is it shown that men act thus, in both cases, on moral grounds?

(3.) What domestic rewards and punishments are instanced?

(4.) What civil rewards and punishments are instanced?

Why are such instances not to be esteemed frivolous?

What is the general conclusion as to the external consequences of virtue and vice?

What two proofs of a moral government of God are contrasted, and what is the respective force of them?

1st *Objection*, That the rule of rewarding virtue and punishing vice is not invariable.

What two reasons are given for this rule?

How is it shown that this rule is never reversed?

How are any apparent instances of an approbation of vice, as such and for its own sake, to be explained?

What distinction between virtue and vice is insisted upon?

Why must they thus be distinguished in some degree?

2d *Objection*, That happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules than this alone.

In what other way is it conceded that they may be distributed?

How is such promiscuous distribution of happiness and misery to be accounted for?

How is it shown that these seeming exceptions never amount to an actual inversion of the rule of punishing vice and rewarding virtue?

How is it shown that in such cases Providence does not confound the distinction between virtue and vice?

To what alone must such disorders be attributed?

What then is the proper conclusion as to the disposition of the Supreme Author of Nature in regard to virtue and vice?

How may a man ascertain that he is on the same side with the the Divine administration? And what will the effect to such a man?

4. THE NATURAL TENDENCIES OF VIRTUE AND VICE.

How are these defined, and what evidence do they afford of a moral government of God?

What accidental causes arrest them in *individuals*?

How is it proposed to show their operation in a *society*?

(I.) *The acknowledged Tendency of Reason to prevail over Force.*

How is man shown to be the governing animal upon earth?

What is acknowledged to be the ground of this superiority?

(a.) *Concurrences necessary to the prevalence of Reason.*

By what imaginary case is it shown that there must be some proportion between the power of rational and of brute creatures?

By what imaginary case is it shown that there must be union among rational creatures?

By what imaginary case is it shown that there must be a fair field and proper time and scope for action?

(b.) *Possible hindrances to the prevalence of Reason.*

How might the very foresight and prudence of rational creatures prove disadvantages in an encounter with brutal folly and rashness?

How might their conflicting interests and passions render them powerless against an instinctive combination of brutes?

What is inferred as to the actual superiority of rational animals?

What is inferred as to a supposed superiority of irrational animals in some other globe?

Why would every one consider this an inverted order of things?

(II.) *The Analogous Tendency of Virtue to prevail over Vice.*

Under what two-fold view may the power of Virtue be considered?

In what four ways does Virtue tend to prevalence in society?

Why are the virtues of veracity and justice especially endowed with this tendency?

(1.) *Hypothetical Prevalence of Virtue throughout the Universe.*

By what supposition is it proposed to illustrate the tendency of Virtue to universal prevalence?

(a.) What three concurrences are as necessary to the prevalence of virtue as of reason?

Why cannot the power of the good here on earth prevail over that of the bad?

Why cannot good men all over the earth unite?

Why cannot virtue find full scope in the present state?

(b.) What is supposable as to the existing hinderances of Virtue?

To what is her present state likened?

How may she hereafter acquire her normal power?

How may she hereafter find proper scope for action?

How may she hereafter unite good men among themselves and with other orders of virtuous creatures?

What would be the moral effect of such a universal combination of virtuous creatures?

How is it shown that these suppositions are not absurd or extravagant?

Why are they not to be taken as a literal delineation of the universe?

What, however, do they plainly show in regard to the hinderances of virtue?

How are its advantageous tendencies to be regarded from a religious point of view?

If the foregoing supposition seem too vast and remote, what, however, will still remain certain?

(2.) *Hypothetical Prevalence of Virtue in some Earthly Society.*

What is the implied advantage of this over the foregoing supposition?

What are the data assumed in it?

(A.) *Internal Condition of a Virtuous State.*

In such a State, what would the governing class be?

How would diversities of genius be adjusted?

How would public laws be made and executed?

How would individuals be related to the public good?

How would such a state be secured against both intestine disorder and foreign assaults?

(B.) *External Relations of a Virtuous State.*

How would it acquire general influence over the face of the earth?

How would it acquire universal empire?

What would its head be, and how would all nations be related to him?

How far is such a virtuous society practicable?

How is it shown that the conditional promises in Scripture to the Jews proceed upon this view of the natural tendencies of Virtue?

III. THE PROBABLE COMPLETION OF GOD'S MORAL GOVERNMENT IN A FUTURE STATE.

How is the general system of religion defined? And how do the foregoing observations enable us to see its self-consistency and tendency towards completion?

How could any one who doubts its importance easily convince himself of it?

Objection, That the present mixed state of Virtue and Vice may be universal and perpetual.

1. *The Objection of no force against the proper proof of Religion.*

(1.) Why is this objection not strictly relevant to the previous argument?

What is admitted in regard to the present distribution of pleasure and pain among us?

Were there nothing else to reason from, what would be the state of the question?

2. *The Objection refuted by four confirmatory proofs from Nature.*

(2.) How then is the contrary of the above objection to be proved?

1. THE MANIFEST INCLINATION OF THE AUTHOR OF NATURE TO THE SIDE OF VIRTUE.

How far do the foregoing arguments prove that the Author of Nature is not indifferent to Virtue and Vice?

Aside from the proper proof of religion, what would be their force as to a future perfect moral government?

What then is the value of the proof furnished by the constitution and course of nature?

2. THE APPARENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXPERIENCED AND THE EXPECTED GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

How do the foregoing observations show that a future perfect moral government of God would not differ from this present government in *kind*, but only in *degree*?

How do they show that it would be that in *effect* towards which we now see a tendency?

How do they show that it would be but the completion of beginnings and principles already discernible?

3. THE ANALOGOUS EXPECTATION OF A FUTURE PERFECT NATURAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

What is assumed in this expectation, and on what is it based?

On what ground may a similar expectation arise under the present moral government of God?

What would be the proper degree of such an expectation on such grounds?

4. THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE TENDENCIES OF VIRTUE AND VICE.

In what important respect do the tendencies of Virtue and Vice differ from their impediments or hinderances?

What may be argued from this difference?

And what will follow as to the tendencies of virtue and vice? but what can revelation alone teach us concerning them?

What is a summary of the whole argument for a perfect moral government.

THE NATURAL SEQUENCE AND CHARACTER OF A FUTURE PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT.

Why is the notion of a future more perfect moral government natural rather than fictitious?

What do the essential tendencies of virtue and vice imply on the part of the Author of Nature?

What is the presumption afforded by every natural tendency, and to what is its degree proportioned?

What is the distinctive force of this proof as to the completion of the moral government established in nature?

THE PROBABILITY OF A PRESENT STATE OF PROBATION.

(CHAP. IV.)

(SECTION I.) THE NATURE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL AND DANGER.

What is the general doctrine of religion as to the relation of the present to the future life, and what several things are comprehended under it?

Why is this doctrine implied in that of a moral government?

What, then, is the difference between being on probation and being subject to government?

What particular features or elements of probation are now to be considered?

THE GENERAL ANALOGY BETWEEN NATURAL PROBATION AND RELIGIOUS PROBATION.

What kind of probation or trial is implied in the moral government of God?

What kind of probation is implied in the natural government of God?

How is probation implied in the natural temptations which men encounter?

How is it implied in their common language in regard to misconduct in temporal affairs?

How is it implied in their worldly errors and failures?

How is it implied in the hazards of the young?

How is it implied in vices which are contrary to our worldly interest?

To what is this natural probation analogous?

I. THE ANALOGOUS OCCASIONS OF NATURAL AND OF RELIGIOUS PROBATION.

What are two constituents or occasions of trial in both natural and religious probation ?

How is it shown that temptations may arise from external circumstances ?

How is it shown that they may arise from internal passions or habits ?

How is it shown that such temptations from without and from within imply each other ?

How does it appear that we are in a like state of trial respecting our temporal and our eternal interests ?

What description is given of our natural probation, and how will it apply to our religious probation ?

II. THE ANALOGOUS EFFECTS OF NATURAL AND OF RELIGIOUS PROBATION.

How is it shown that some men are as reckless of their temporal as of their eternal interests ?

By what are some men as much blinded in worldly as in religious concerns ?

How are some carried away, in both cases, even against their better judgment ?

How do others seem even to court their temporal as well as eternal ruin ?

What in general is the liability, and often the actual conduct, of human creatures as respects both interests ?

III. THE ANALOGOUS AGGRAVATIONS OF NATURAL AND OF RELIGIOUS PROBATION.

1. *Aggravations from the ill-behavior of others.*

In what ways are the difficulties of religious probation increased or made by the ill-behavior of others ?

How are the difficulties of natural probation increased in like manner ?

2. *Aggravations from their own ill-behavior.*

How do some persons increase the difficulties of both probations by their own ill-behavior ?

How do they especially increase them in youth ?

IV. THE ANALOGOUS OBJECTIONS TO NATURAL AND TO RELIGIOUS PROBATION.

1st Objection. That such Probation is inequitable.

What does our condition in the creation seem to be as respects both our temporal and our future interests ?

Why is this no more to be complained of in religious than in natural probation ?

And why have we no reason to complain of it, with regard to the Author of Nature ?

How does the previous argument render the doctrine of religious probation credible?

2d Objection. That it is improbable that our future interest should depend upon our present behavior.

What changes supposed in our natural condition, or in our natural character, might give room for this objection?

Were there no natural probation as to temporal interests, how might the objector then argue?

But what are the evidences of natural probation which render religious probation credible?

3d Objection. That it is improbable that there should be anything of hazard in the Divine Foreknowledge.

In what case might this objection have been speciously urged? and on what ground?

And what must be conceded as to the difficulty?

But what are still the facts in our condition?

What instances are named of contingencies left dependent upon our conduct?

How far do these observations refute objections to the credibility of a state of probation?

How do they show our danger of failing of our future eternal interest?

THE PROBABILITY OF A MORAL EDUCATION FOR THE FUTURE LIFE.

(CHAP. V.)

(SECTION II.) THE DESIGN OF PROBATION AS INTENDED FOR THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER.

What difficult question arises from the consideration of our probation-state.

How might its difficulties be lessened? But what must be acknowledged in regard to it?

What considerations may reconcile us to our ignorance?

How much may be affirmed as certain concerning it?

What more important question than the origin of probation does this answer?

What, then, is the known object or design of probation?

ANALOGY BETWEEN NATURAL EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

To what is the beginning of life in the present world analogous? and in what respect?

How is it proposed to show the extent and force of this analogy?

I. PRELIMINARY PRINCIPLES OF ALL EDUCATION.

A. *The Necessary Correspondence between Character and Condition.*

What two constituents enter into every creature's way of life? and how are they related to each other?

How are they shown to be essential in man?

How is this expressed by an ancient writer?

How are human life and happiness connected with this correspondence?

What is the inference as to the future character and condition?

B. *The Capability of New Character corresponding to New Condition.*

What capability exists in the constitution of man and other creatures?

What differently constituted species of creatures may be imagined ?

But what is the constitution of every species known to us ?

(I.) *By means of the Faculty of Knowledge.*

With what capacities besides those of perception and knowledge are we endued ?

(II.) *By means of the Faculty of Habit.*

What capabilities beside those of acting and receiving impressions have we ?

How are perception and knowledge to be distinguished from habits ?

But what capacities of acquiring knowledge are improvable by exercise ? and how can they be regarded as habits ?

And how do perceptions acquire a character of habit ?

(1.) *The Classification of Habits into (a.) Active and Passive.*

What instance is given of a habit of perception ?

In what light may all other associations of ideas be regarded ? and to what are they likened ?

What instances are given of a habit of action ?

(b.) *Bodily and Mental or Moral Habits.*

What examples are given of habits of body and of mind ?

(2.) *The Formation of Moral Habits (a.) by outward moral acts.*

How are moral as well as bodily habits formed ?

How does their formation differ from that of bodily habits ?

Why cannot they be formed by any mere external course of action ?

(b.) *By inward moral acts.*

How are habits of attention, industry, and self-government formed ? and how are habits of envy and revenge formed ?

How do good resolutions and virtuous inculcations contribute to forming good habits ?

(c.) *But not by mere passive impressions.*

What, however, may be the effect of mere theorizing about virtue ?

How are mere passive impressions affected by their repetition, and what examples are given ?

What follows from the combined influence of repeated acts and impressions ?

How does experience confirm this ?

How is it shown in persons accustomed to danger ?

How is it shown in persons accustomed to relieve distress ?

How is it shown in persons accustomed to scenes of death ?

(d.) *Except so far as passive impressions induce corresponding action.*

What, therefore, is the precise efficacy of such passive impressions as are made by admonition, experience, or example ?

But how are real endeavors to enforce good impressions upon ourselves to be regarded ?

(3.) *The Nature and Effect of Habits.*

Is it important to know whether the same effects might not be wrought in us at once, in some other way than by habits?

What is conceded as to their progress and the faculty by which we are capable of them?

What is still matter of certain experience concerning them?

What is the experienced effect of habit in any course of action?

What is its effect upon our aversions to such course of action, the difficulties in it, and the reasons for it?

What is the effect of Habit upon practical principles, absolutely as well as relatively?

And what is the effect upon the whole character and life?

II. THE CONSEQUENT PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL EDUCATION.

Why, in general, have we these faculties of knowledge and habit?

How far are they necessary to us even in our temporal capacity?

C. The Necessity for Qualification for Mature Life.

How is it shown that Nature does not qualify us wholly, or at once, for mature life?

By what supposition is this illustrated?

What would men in society be without experience and habit?

To what are such deficiencies compared?

In what state, then, is mankind left by nature as respects mature life?

D. The Opportunity for Improvement in Early Life.

How does Nature enable us to supply these deficiencies, and in what favorable condition does she place us?

How are children qualified in knowledge for their part in the scene of mature life?

How are they trained in domestic life for social and civil life?

What valuable experience are they daily gaining; what rules do they learn; and to what may their manner of learning them be compared?

How do the example, instruction, and care of others enter into this natural education?

Of ourselves, what is in great part required?

Without labor or other sorts of application in youth, what will follow in after life?

And how do different persons at length reach different stations in society?

In what important light, then, is the former part of life to be considered?

III. THE ANALOGOUS PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

To what is our discipline in childhood for mature age analogous?

To what extent does this analogy hold?

Why would it still hold, though we were unable to discern how the present life could be a preparation for the future life?

How is this proved by the unconsciousness and ignorance of children during their development and education?

Even without considering God's moral government, what would still be supposable from analogy as to the relation of the present to the future life?

But, with that consideration, how can it be explained? and in what particulars will the proposed analogy hold?

(A.) THE MORAL CHARACTER PROPER TO OUR FUTURE CONDITION.

1. THE ACTIVE VIRTUES REQUISITE IN A FUTURE STATE.

What is the proof that the future state will not be solitary and inactive?

What is conceded and what is maintained with regard to the Scripture representation of it as under the more immediate sensible government of God?

Notwithstanding our ignorance of this happy community, what virtues prevail in it, and what may be affirmed respecting them?

What may also be true, there, of the character formed by the practice of the same virtues here?

What, in general, must be held to be the qualification for our future happiness? and on what ground?

(B.) OUR CAPABILITY OF THE MORAL CHARACTER PROPER TO OUR FUTURE CONDITION.

How has it been already shown that we are capable of moral improvement?

(C.) THE NECESSITY OF MORAL QUALIFICATION FOR THE FUTURE LIFE.

How is the necessity of moral improvement obvious from general observation as well as from the consciousness of the best men?

To what higher source, however, must this necessity be traced?

(I.) *Our Original Need of Virtuous Habits as Finite Creatures.*

(1.) *The Moral Constitution of all Finite Creatures.*

What constitutional peril probably exists in all finite creatures? and what is the security against it?

(a.) *The Danger arising from Propensities.*

Beside the moral principle, what affections have we in our inward frame?

To what extent are they naturally and of right subject to the moral principle?

To what extent has the moral principle no power over men?

How is this shown by their natural exercise in presence of their objects?

How is it shown by the nature of their objects, even when they cannot be obtained innocently?

And when they can only be obtained by unlawful means, what tendency and consequent danger arises from such innocent affections?

(b.) *The Security arising from Virtue.*

From whence and from what is the general security against this danger of actual deviation?

What will be the effect of strengthening or improving the moral principle?

By what means may it be improved?

On what grounds should we accustom ourselves to act upon equity and right rather than from humor and mere inclination?

In what proportion will such a habit of virtue be a security against the danger of defection?

What is here supposed as to the future state?

On this supposition what follows as to the relation of virtuous habits to particular affections?

Without this supposition, however, how can it be shown that virtuous habits conduce to happiness?

(2.) *The Consequent Need of Virtuous Habits, even in Upright Creatures.*

What two questions respecting creatures made upright may be explained upon these principles?

(a.) *The Defectibility of Upright Creatures through Particular Affections or Propensions.*

Why cannot their fall be accounted for by the nature of Liberty?

But what renders it distinctly conceivable?

In upright creatures, what besides propensions must be supposed, and how would both natural and moral principles be combined in their constitution?

How are particular propensions related to their objects and to the moral principle, and what tendency arises from their exercise?

How may this tendency, in some one particular propension, be increased by outward and inward causes, and in what may it terminate?

From whence arises this danger of deviation, and how far is it avoidable?

What illustration is given?

What might be the effect of a single irregularity, and what would be the effect of repeated irregularities?

In what proportion, then, are upright creatures defectible?

(b.) *The Perfectibility of Upright Creatures through Virtuous Habits.*

How might these creatures, instead of falling, have raised themselves to a higher state of virtue?

Why would they lessen their danger by thus preserving their integrity for some time, and what two processes are therefore implied in the notion of virtuous habits?

What, therefore, are the inward effects, as well as nature, of vicious indulgence and virtuous self-government respectively?

On what supposition may it be allowed that upright creatures must ever remain defectible?

Yet to what degree may they still be improved and perfectible?

To what, however, would such higher perfection and security ever continue to be due?

What follows, then as to the essential holiness of the Creator and the original danger and security of creatures?

What may be the ground of their danger, and how may virtuous habits be related to it?

Of what are they naturally capable, and in what correspondent circumstances may it be fit that they should be placed?

(II.) *Our Increased Need of Virtuous Habits as Fallen Creatures.*

How does this reasoning apply to fallen creatures?

What is the difference between the wants of upright creatures and those of depraved creatures?

How are education and discipline adapted to the one as compared with the other?

For what reasons must discipline of the severer sort be necessary in depraved creatures?

(D.) THE OPPORTUNITY FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE IN THE PRESENT LIFE.

To what class is the present world peculiarly adapted to be a state of discipline?

(1.) *Present Opportunities of acquiring a Moderate and Reasonable Temper.*

What circumstances in our present life give it a disciplinary tendency?

Do all of them produce the same effects?

When duly reflected upon, however, what dispositions do they directly tend to produce?

And what contrary dispositions may be observed in minds not thus disciplined?

(2.) *Present Opportunities of acquiring a Practical Sense of our Frailty.*

What does our present experience teach us as to our passions, our helplessness, and our danger of vice and wretchedness?

What kind of an impression of our liability to vice and misery does such experience tend to give us?

To what may the security of perfected creatures be due?

And how may such impressions be made everlasting in our minds?

(3.) *Present Opportunities of acquiring Habits of Virtue.*

What things are enumerated as among the snares and temptations of the present life?

To whom are they disciplinary? and why?

Why do recollection, intention, and self-government in the practice of virtue tend to form habits of virtue

How is this illustrated?

How is it shown that self-denial is not essential to virtue and piety?

But how does it tend to form and confirm habits of virtue and piety?

1st Objection. That in theory there may be a limit to Moral, as to Bodily and Intellectual Improvement.

(1.) *Such limitation cannot be proved.*

How far are our intellectual or physical powers improvable?

What is conceded with respect to the moral character?

(2.) *Such limitation, if proved, only exceptional.*

How will the concession affect the previous argument?

Allowing for exceptions, what is the general view to be taken of the present life?

To what is moral improvement likened?

2d Objection. That in fact the present life is so generally perverted into a discipline of vice rather than of virtue.

What is conceded with respect to the present state? and to what extent can it be accounted for?

(1.) *The Failures of the Vicious only increase the Discipline of the Virtuous.*

To what class is the viciousness of the world the great temptation?

Amidst the general corruption, what is their character and conduct?

Why is the present world more disciplinary to them than a perfectly virtuous society would be?

(2.) *The Failures of the Vicious are sufficiently in accordance with the analogy of nature.*

What analogous failures occur in plants and animals, and in what proportion?

How may the analogy be applied to the mystery of the ruin of so many moral agents?

3d Objection. That a Moral Discipline proceeding from Hope and Fear is only an exercise of Self-love.

What course of behavior may seem open to this objection?

(1.) *Proper Self-love, though subordinate, not antagonistic, to Religious Obedience.*

What is religious obedience? and how is it affected by self-love?

What will result from a course of such obedience?

What will result from a constant regard to veracity, justice, and charity, and how, and to what extent will it subordinate self-love?

(2.) *Proper Self-love an element and motive of Religious Character.*

What other moral principles besides self-love enter into our actions,

and why is there no ground for nice distinctions between them?

How will a life begun in one involve progress and perfection in the others?

II. THE PASSIVE VIRTUES REQUISITE IN THE FUTURE STATE.

How does the whole previous reasoning apply to the virtue of passive resignation as well as to active obedience?

What difficulty may be imagined as to the exercise of such virtues in the future state, but why must it be treated as imaginary?

(C.) THE NECESSITY FOR HABITS OF RESIGNATION IN THE FUTURE STATE.

What occasion may even prosperity give for the passive virtues?

How does imagination more than any external condition give ground for them?

What is conceded and what maintained with regard to patience in a state where there is no sorrow?

(1.) *The Need of Resignation in all Creatures.*

Why is the principle of self-interest coincident with the principle of obedience?

But how far may it be questioned whether the mere desire of self-interest can be thus absolutely coincident with the will of God?

Why, then, may habits of resignation be necessary for all creatures?

(2.) *The Need of Resignation in Human Creatures.*

What, at least, are the effects of mere passive self love in human creatures, and of what does it therefore stand in need?

(D.) THE OPPORTUNITY FOR ACQUIRING HABITS OF RESIGNATION IN THE PRESENT STATE.

What is the effect of a long course of active obedience upon the passive affections, and how does it tend to habituate the mind to resignation?

What, however, is the proper discipline of resignation, and how does it tend to habituate the mind to that virtue?

What character results from this combination of the active and passive habits of virtue?

Why cannot such a character be regarded as a blind submission to mere power?

What now is the whole previous argument, and the conclusion from it?

General Objection. That we might have been spared all this discipline by being made at once what we are to be.

How does experience show this objection to be vain?

And how does the general conduct of nature refute it?

What qualifications are the natural supply to our deficiencies? and why is it natural to us to seek them?

What general law of nature plainly governs our temporal interest throughout our present life?

What alternative does it leave us?

What, therefore, follows from analogy as to the future life?

(SECTION III.) THE EFFECT OF PROBATION AS INVOLVING THE MANIFESTATION OF CHARACTER.

In what third light may we regard the present world as related to the future world?

To whom may it be possible that such manifestation of character should be made?

How may this feature of probation be related to the other two features already presented?

1. *This View supported by sound conjecture.*

What, at least, is possible as to the manifestation of persons' characters in the present state?

What ends may it serve, both as respects the persons themselves and as respects the rest of the creation?

2. *This View supported by Analogy.*

(1.) *The Manifestation of Character involved in Natural Government.*

How does the manifestation of character now enter into the general course of nature respecting mankind?

(2.) *The Manifestation of Character involved in Moral Government.*

In what two senses has probation been treated in this chapter? and in what sense in the foregoing chapter?

Why are the two former especially, as well as the latter, implied in moral government?

THE FATALISTIC OBJECTIONS AGAINST RELIGION.

(CHAP. VI.)

Throughout the foregoing argument, what analogy has been maintained?

What must a fatalist assert with respect to our temporal condition? and what question, therefore, arises in the way of analogy?

What is meant by saying that the question is not absolute but hypothetical?

What will be its bearing upon the fatalist?

What renders the puzzle and obscurity of arguing such a question excusable?

I. NECESSITARIANISM RECONCILABLE WITH THE PRELIMINARY DOCTRINE OF THEISM.

What fundamental doctrine of all religion has been taken for granted throughout the previous argument?

What objection may be raised to it from the opinion of universal necessity?

What is to be shown in opposition to this objection? and why is such an argument at this point requisite?

1. *Nature, if Necessitated, might still have been Designed.*

What does the fatalist or necessitarian affirm respecting the whole constitution of nature?

What analogical proof have we that such necessity does not exclude intelligence or design?

What circumstance alone does necessity explain with regard to the origin and continuance of nature?

What question does it leave untouched, and what is the real question which it answers?

2. *Nature, if Necessitated, might still have had an Author.*

Wherein would a Libertarian and a Necessitarian agree, and wherein would they differ, as to the construction of a house?

How might they also express themselves with regard to the constitution of nature? But what must they really mean?

Why is the Necessitarian obliged to imply an agent acting necessarily?

Objection. That we may ascribe to Nature the peculiar necessary existence ascribed to God

What kind of necessary existence do we ascribe to God?

(1.) *Demonstration of the Necessary Existence of God.*

What is that idea of Infinity which we find within ourselves?

What do we intuitively discern respecting it external to ourselves, and why cannot it be a mere abstract in our minds?

What, therefore, must be the concrete or archetype of our idea of infinity?

For what reason, then, and in what sense do we attribute the word necessity to God?

(2.) *Absurdity of attributing such Necessary Existence to Nature.*

How is this kind of Divine Necessity distinguished from that of the fatalist before defined?

Why cannot such necessity be attributed to Nature, or everything that exists?

3. *Necessitarianism, therefore, no better theory than Libertarianism.*

What are the two conclusions from the previous reasoning respecting Necessity, which the fatalist is obliged to accept?

Why, then, would the theory of Necessity account for the formation of the world no better than the theory of Liberty?

And what proof of an Intelligent Author of Nature would remain as real on the theory of Necessity as on the theory of Liberty?

II. NECESSITARIANISM RECONCILABLE WITH THE SYSTEM OF RELIGION.

What is the main question ensuing upon the previous argument?

On what supposition will it be argued that the opinion of necessity is reconcilable with religion? and to what extent?

(I.) HUMAN CONDUCT, IF NECESSITATED, MIGHT STILL INVOLVE MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY.

(1.) *Manifest Absurdity of Fatalism in Common Life.*

What case is supposed to illustrate the practical absurdity of fatalism?

How does this illustration serve to show the lack of common sense in such speculations, their disastrous tendency in practice, and their final issue in utter failure?

What other illustration is given of the absurdity of acting on the theory of necessity?

On the contrary, what are the effects of acting on the theory of freedom?

What may, therefore, be inferred as to the opinion of necessity practically considered? and what, perhaps, also as to the opinion of freedom, speculatively considered?

(2.) *Analogous Absurdity of Fatalism in Religion.*

What is the precise point insisted upon in the previous argument, with regard to our present worldly interest?

What may now be inferred as to the practical application of fatalistic opinions to the more general interest of religion?

Why cannot we conclude from such opinions that we are free from the obligations of religion?

To what is the fallacy of such conclusions likened?

Why, then, is the evidence of religion as conclusive on the theory of necessity as of freedom?

And why is this no reflection upon reason?

(H.) DIVINE GOVERNMENT, IF NECESSITATED, MIGHT STILL INVOLVE MORAL CHARACTER.

(1.) *Necessity Reconcilable with some Character in God.*

What is the analogical proof of this afforded by our own consciousness?

What is the proof afforded by natural government and final causes?

[*Note.* In what sense are the terms *will* and *character* here employed?]

(2.) *Necessity Reconcilable with Moral Character in God.*

With what particular Divine attributes, fundamental to religion, is necessity reconcilable?

What is the analogical proof of this afforded by our own experience and observation?

1st Objection. That it would be inconsistent with such a Moral Character in God to punish necessary agents

1. *The Objection absurd on its own terms.*

On what supposition does this objection proceed, and what plausible reason is given for it?

How is its absurdity exposed on its own terms?

2. *The Objection recoils into a Proof.*

What proof does it incidentally afford of those very moral qualities at which it is aimed?

2d Objection. That the proof of such a Moral Character in God would be invalidated by Necessitarianism.

How is the Moral Character of God related to religion, and what question may here be raised as to the proof of that character?

1. *The Objection refuted by our own experience.*

How does our experience of happiness and misery refute all fatalistic theories?

2. *The Objection refuted by the necessity of the case.*

What is the experienced natural government of God, and what makes it plain, in spite of fatalistic theories, that it must be exercised on moral principles?

III. NECESSITARIANISM RECONCILABLE WITH THE PROOF OF RELIGION.

What two reasons are given for showing more particularly that the proof of religion is not destroyed by the theory of necessity?

(1.) THE INTERNAL EVIDENCE NOT INVALIDATED.

(1.) *The Proof of an Intelligent Author of Nature.*

On what supposition of the necessitarian will this proof remain unaffected? and why?

(2.) *The Proof of a Divine Government by Rewards and Punishments.*

Why does this proof also remain unimpaired?

(3.) *The Proof of a Moral Government of God.*

(a.) *The Direct Proof of a Moral Faculty within us.*

What is the moral faculty God has given us?

How is an authoritative rule of action implied in it?

How does consciousness prove its dictates to be the law of God?

How is the same proved from the nature of a divine command, as related to the perceptions of the moral faculty?

(b.) *The Consequent Proof of Moral Rewards and Punishments.*

What purposes do the perceptions of the moral faculty serve in the government of God? and why must He have given them to us?

What may thence be concluded as to the relation of the government of God to our moral nature, and the consequent relation of misery to vice and happiness to virtue?

What argument might also be deduced for the obligations of religious worship?

(c.) *This Experimental Proof of God's Moral Government not Invalidated by Necessitarianism.*

Why can no objection from necessity be against the existence of the moral faculty?

Why can none be brought against the conclusion from it, that God will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked?

How is it shown to be a reasoning from fact rather than from the mere fitness of things?

[*Note.* Does Butler here deny that the will of God may be determined by the fitness of things?

How are such expressions as *fitness of action*, or *right and reason of the case* shown to be intelligible?

How is it conceivable that God's will may be as much determined by the nature of things in reference to moral right as His judgment is so determined in reference to abstract truth?]

(d.) *The Confirmatory Proof of God's Moral Government not Invalidated.*

What three confirmatory proofs from other facts are also unaffected by fatalism?

(II.) THE EXTERNAL EVIDENCE NOT INVALIDATED.

How is the nature of this evidence illustrated?

How is the evidence from history related to the evidence from reason?

Under what three heads is this evidence summed up?

(1.) *General Consent of Mankind.*

What is shown by the general consent of mankind in respect to this system of religion?

(2.) *Early Belief in Religion.*

Were there any superstitious additions to religion in the first ages of the world?

What is the alternative to be inferred from the early prevalence of a system of pure religion?

To which opinion do learned men incline?

What renders it probable that religion was not simply reasoned out in primitive times?

Is there such a presumption against a primitive revelation as against a modern one?

What would be the most probable account a skeptic himself could give of the early pretences to religion.

(3.) *Historical Testimony.*

Why should ancient tradition and history be admitted as additional proof of a primitive revelation?

What is the precise weight of such proof at this stage of the argument?

What is the extent of the external evidence of religion?

The Need of Caution in judging the Proofs of Religion.

To what dangers is the speculative reason liable? and the moral understanding?

Why does this prove nothing against the reality of our speculative and practical faculties?

But of what does it admonish us, and what are we in danger of substituting in place of the true moral rule?

What is the proper effect of the internal and external evidence of religion taken together?

What might weaken this positive proof?

GENERAL OBJECTION. That all this Proof rests upon contradictory assumptions by involving Libertarian as opposed to Necessitarian principles.

(1.) *Logical Terms of the Objection.*

How may probabilities, which cannot themselves be confuted, be over-balanced?

In what case would there be no need even of thus repelling such arguments?

On what supposition does the method of government by rewards and punishments proceed, and what absurdity is there alleged?

(2.) *Alternative Refutations of the Objection.*

What shows the conclusion from the reasoning to be false on either theory?

On the theory of freedom, where does the fallacy lie?

On the theory of necessity, where does the fallacy lie?

How is this latter fallacy disproved in the case of brutes?

How is it disproved in the case of men in natural society?

How is it disproved by the natural rewards and punishments of gratitude, resentment, etc.?

What, then, is the dilemma into which the objector may be driven?

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

What is the general conclusion from the whole previous reasoning in relation to the theory of necessity, and how does it apply to Revealed, as well as Natural Religion?

In what two senses alone may necessitarianism be said to be the destruction of all religion?

But in what sense may it be said to be perfectly reconcilable with religion?

THE MORAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST RELIGION.

(CHAP. VII.)

What is the argumentative force of Analogy upon the doctrines of religion, and upon fatalistic objections to them?

What class of objections remain, to which Analogy is no direct answer?

Why cannot Analogy be a direct answer to these objections, but how may it indirectly suggest an answer to them?

What are the two heads of the proposed argument?

1. THE GENERAL ANALOGY BETWEEN THE SCHEMES OF NATURE AND RELIGION IN RESPECT TO THEIR INCOMPREHENSIBILITY.

How is the incomprehensibility of the moral government of God to be proved?

1. *The Incomprehensibility of the Scheme of Nature.*

(1.) *Nature a Scheme, or System of Things.*

How is the scheme or system of nature described?

In this scheme, how are creatures related to each other, and how far do these relations extend?

In this scheme, how are actions and events related to each other?

(2.) *The Scheme of Nature Incomprehensible.*

Why cannot we affirm that all creatures and events throughout nature are related together?

But what is certain in regard to the connections of all events?

Why cannot we give the whole account of any one thing?

To what extent do the unknown connections of things exist?

How are we convinced that almost any one thing may be a necessary condition to any other.

2. *Analogous Incomprehensibility of the Scheme of Religion.*

How far, then, is the natural world incomprehensible, and what may thence be inferred as to the moral world?

(1.) *Providence a Scheme as well as Nature.*

How, indeed, are the two probably connected together?

But what is the general analogy here insisted upon?

How is the scheme of God's moral administration described? and what are some of its features?

(2.) *The Scheme of Providence Incomprehensible.*

Why are we not competent judges of this moral scheme, and what follows as to the objections against it?

3. *The Consequent Folly of Objections against the Scheme of Religion.*

What two reasons are given for showing more distinctly that our ignorance is a just answer to objections against the scheme of Providence?

(1.) *Our Ignorance is a just answer to such Objections.*

What two alternative objections are supposed by way of argument?

Were either of these suppositions true, why might the government of the world be just and good notwithstanding?

But why are they mere arbitrary assertions?

How is this shown in things much less out of our reach than the scheme of Providence?

(2.) *Our Ignorance a satisfactory answer to such Objections.*

If Providence were not a scheme, would our ignorance of some dispensations be any answer to objections against the justice and goodness of others?

But when it is viewed as made up of related parts, why is our ignorance a satisfactory answer?

II. PARTICULARS IN WHICH THE SCHEMES OF NATURE AND RELIGION ARE ANALOGOUSLY WISE AND GOOD.

1. *The Analogy between Natural and Moral Means and Ends.*

In the scheme of the natural world, how do ends appear to be accomplished?

(1.) *The Wisdom and Goodness of Natural Means and Ends.*

What kind of means and ends are often connected?

How do we learn this connection?

What does experience teach us in regard to the tendency or fitness of some means?

(2.) *The Wisdom and Goodness of Moral Means and Ends.*

In the analogous scheme of the moral world, what objectionable things may serve as means to wise and good ends?

What does the analogy teach as to fitness of such means to such ends?

How do even such things as we call irregularities enter into this system?

Objection. If Evil be the means of Good, why not do evil that good may come?

(1.) *The Permission of evil confessedly better than its Prevention.*

To what good ends is it conceded that the mere capacity of evil may contribute?

In what sense, also, may the actual permission of evil contribute to such ends?

(2.) *The Commission of Evil infinitely worse than its Avoidance.*

How, then, can we obviate the absurd and naked conclusion that evil is better than good?

Why would not this follow, even though it were conceded that the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world?

How may this be illustrated by the analogy of diseases which are themselves remedies?

2. *The Analogy between Natural and Moral Laws.*

How is the natural government of the world carried on?

(1.) *The Wisdom and Goodness of General Laws in the Natural World.*

Why may there be the wisest and best reasons for such general laws?

How is it shown to us that there are such reasons for them?

How do we procure our enjoyments by means of them?

How may we account for irregularities under these general laws?

Objection. That Irregularities might be prevented by Interpositions.

How is it supposed that such interpositions might be consistent with general laws?

On what supposition is it conceded that such interpositions would be desirable?

But what immediate bad effects would they plainly have?

And what distant bad effects would they also have?

If it is replied that such bad effects might be prevented by further interpositions, what is the proper rejoinder?

(2.) *The Wisdom and Goodness of General Laws in the Moral World.*

What may we now conclude as to the wisdom and goodness of general laws?

What may we conclude as to the occurrence of irregularities under them?

Why may the withholding of interpositions be an instance of goodness and wisdom rather than a ground of complaint?

What may reconcile us to this view of Providence?

General Objection. That arguing thus upon our Ignorance is invalidating the proof of Religion as well as the objections against it.

How is this objection plausibly stated?

1. *Our ignorance of the Scheme of Religion not total but partial.*

What is conceded as to the effect of total ignorance on the proof of anything?

What is the proof of religion here insisted upon, and what illustration is used to show that partial ignorance has no such bearing upon the proof of religion as it has upon the objections against it?

2. *Our Ignorance consistent at least with the moral obligations of Religion.*

Even if our ignorance could render the proof of religion doubtful, yet what would still remain? and what alone would be uncertain as to our moral obligations?

How would our own consciousness render these obligations certain?

And how would considerations of interest render them certain?

3. *Our Ignorance, as previously defined, not as applicable to the proof of religion as to the objections against it.*

How has it been shown, from the analogy of nature, that objections against religion are delusive?

If we were as cognizant of the scheme of religion as we are ignorant of it, how might the things objected against then appear?

And why, then, is the argument from ignorance not applicable to the peculiar proof of religion?

4. *Our Ignorance not so much the ground of this argument as our incompetency.*

What else, together with our ignorance, serves to answer objections against the system of religion?

How does analogy show us to be incompetent judges of religion?

How far, then, have we been arguing from our experience as well as from our ignorance?

CONCLUSION OF PART I.

I. INFERENCES FROM THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENT.

1. *That we are involved in a vast, Progressive, though Incomprehensible, System of Nature and Providence.*

What may now be inferred as to the present scene of human life?

What is uncertain, and what is evident, as to our relations in the universe?

What may be inferred as to the character of that system in which we find ourselves?

How is it shown that the system of nature is as wonderful as that of religion? and, indeed, that the former is wholly inexplicable without the latter?

What is the proper proof, pre-supposed in this whole Analogy, of an Intelligent Author and Moral Governor of the world?

2. *That we are ourselves highly interested in the development of this Divine System of the Universe.*

Whether this Divine System be moral or not, what is certain respecting it and our relations to it?

How do irrational animals act their part in this system?

But to rational creatures, what reflections would seem unavoidable respecting it and their relations and interest in it?

II. SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENT.

What are the proofs, before given, of our future life and interest?

What are the proofs, before given, of our interest in both the natural and moral government of God?

What are the proofs, before given, of our future interest being dependent upon our present conduct?

What are the proofs, before given, that our present state is intended to qualify us for the future state?

What two classes of objections have been refuted? and in what way?

III. APPLICATION OF THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENT.

1. *The Credibility of Religion sufficient to induce Earnest Consideration.*

What is the peculiar nature of the previous arguments, and what effect should they have upon men of common sense?

How does immoral thoughtlessness appear, in view of them?

2. *The Credibility of Religion sufficient to induce a Life of Virtue and Piety.*

How should they induce men to live? under what apprehension?

What prudential considerations will counterbalance any doubt as to the future judgment?

(1.) *No Reason for Irreligion in the Passions.*

In the view of reason, how are the passions to be regarded? and how are cool expectations of vicious pleasure to be estimated?

(2.) *No Excuse for Irreligion in the Passions.*

How is it shown that the government of the passions enters into natural prudence as well as into religion?

In distinction from the mere passions, what are the proper motives of religion afforded by its proofs from reason as confirmed by revelation?

THE PRESUMPTIVE IMPORTANCE OF REVEALED RELIGION.

(PART II. CHAP. I.)

1. *Revealed Religion not wholly Unimportant.*

On what pretence do some persons reject all revelation ?

Would this be adequate ground, if tenable ?

(1.) *The Insufficiency of Heathenism.*

How is it disproved by the state of the world before, and without, the christian revelation ?

What is the condition by nature of the greatest men, and what is that of the mass of mankind ?

(2.) *The Insufficiency of Deism.*

What is doubtful, and what is certain, as to the ability and disposition of men to reason out a system of natural religion ?

Were such a system attainable, what supernatural admonition and instruction would still be needed ?

On the best view of our condition, why would a revelation still be far from superfluous ?

2. *Revealed Religion of no small importance.*

On what pretence do certain other persons neglect revelation ?

How do such persons regard its evidence or truth ? and what do they say must be its design ?

• How are natural piety and virtue, in their view, related to Christianity ?

(1.) *Its Importance worth considering.*

How far is the view of those who reject, and those who neglect, revelation distinguishable ? And why should it be considered with reference to both classes ?

What renders an inquiry into the importance of Christianity proper at this point?

(2.) *Its Importance clearly presumable.*

On the very supposition of such a revelation as that of Christianity, what is evident at first sight?

On what grounds alone could we hold it to be unimportant?

Why cannot we take such grounds?

I. REVEALED RELIGION IMPORTANT AS A CONFIRMATION OF NATURAL RELIGION.

What is the first of the two particulars in which Christianity is to be held important?

How is natural religion related to Christianity?

(I.) *Christianity a republication of Natural Religion.*

In what articles of natural religion does Christianity instruct mankind?

(1.) *Natural Religion purified by Revelation.*

How does it appear that Christianity teaches natural religion in its genuine simplicity?

(2.) *Natural Religion authenticated by Revelation.*

What renders Christianity an authoritative publication of natural religion?

What part of revealed religion were miracles and prophecy designed to prove?

But what part of natural religion may they also prove? and why do they prove it?

How far is natural religion thus proved by Scripture?

Objection. That any supernatural evidence for a natural religion is questionable.

How are such objections to be estimated practically?

How is the value of such miraculous evidence to those totally ignorant of natural religion illustrated?

How, then, do the law of Moses and the gospel of Christ serve as authoritative publications of natural religion?

How is the value of miraculous evidence to one thoroughly versed in natural religion illustrated?

(3.) *Natural Religion elucidated by Revelation.*

What doctrines of natural religion are eminently brought to light by the gospel?

(II.) *Christianity an External Institution of Natural Religion.*

How did Christianity at first serve to purify, authenticate, and elucidate natural religion, and how was it intended to serve the same purposes in after ages?

How is the visible church distinguishable from other societies?

(1.) *Natural Religion perpetuated by the Visible Church.*

What purpose does the visible church now serve in distinction from that of the first preachers of Christianity?

What would have become of Christianity, but for the institution of the visible church, and how did it prevent such a result?

How does this view of Christianity show its importance to natural religion?

(2.) *Natural Religion cultivated by the Visible Church.*

How does the visible church, as an educational institution, promote natural religion?

In what does the visibility of the church consist, and how does it appear that positive institutions are important?

By what comparison may these advantages of Christianity to natural religion be made obvious to any that are slow in apprehending them?

Objection. That Christianity has been perverted, or had but little good influence.

(1.) *The objection not properly founded on fact.*

How are the good effects of Christianity, and its supposed ill effects, to be properly estimated?

How may the alleged evils be palliated?

What, however, must be conceded and what maintained as to the corruptions and abuses of it?

(2.) *The Objection inconclusive upon any but atheistical principles.*

Why do such objections lead to downright atheism?

On what principle must the theist, as well as the Christian, proceed in judging of any dispensation of Providence?

How is it expressed in Scripture language?

How is it confirmed by the light of reason and by experience?

(III.) *Christianity a moral enforcement of Natural Religion.*

What express command is laid upon all Christians?

Why is the command obligatory upon them, and in what ways may it be performed?

How does this show the great practical importance of Christianity to natural religion?

II. REVEALED RELIGION IMPORTANT AS THE COMPLEMENT OF NATURAL RELIGION.

How is Christianity to be considered in distinction from natural religion?

(I.) *Christianity a Revelation of New Doctrines.*

What doctrines besides those of natural religion has Christianity revealed?

(II.) *Christianity a Revelation of New Duties.*

What consequent duties, otherwise unknown, are also revealed?

How may the importance of these revealed duties be seen?

How is the relation of God the Father to us ascertained, and how are the relations of the Son and Holy Spirit ascertained?

What are the relations respectively sustained by the three Sacred Persons, and why are duties to the Son and Spirit as unquestionable as duties to the Father?

1. *The Classification of Revealed Duties.*

(1.) *Internal Duties.*

Under what two aspects is true religion to be considered? and what is it according to the first of these notions?

Under the first view, in what does the essence of natural religion consist, and in what consists the essence of revealed religion, as distinguished from natural?

Why is it not material to the obligation of those respective classes of duties that the one is made known by reason and the other by revelation?

What are the revealed offices of the Son and Spirit, and how do our consequent duties immediately arise to the mind of reason?

What are some of the revealed internal duties thus due to the Son and Holy Spirit?

(2.) *External Duties.*

How do we determine the external manner in which this internal worship of the Son and Holy Spirit is to be expressed?

But how far is the internal worship itself to be so determined?

Why is there this difference between the internal and the external duties?

How far is this shown in the history of the gospel itself?

1. *The Moral Importance of Revealed Duties.*

What is now to be inferred as to the importance of Christianity, as distinguished from natural religion?

How does it appear that the obligation of Christian duties is as plainly moral as charity to mankind?

What is overlooked by deists in their estimate of the obligations of Christianity?

Why may it be as perilous to neglect revealed or Christian duties as any natural duties made known by reason?

How far is ignorance an excuse for neglecting either?

(1.) *The Moral Importance of Duties to Christ.*

What high relations are revealed between Christ and us?

What peculiar consequences may follow the neglect of these relations, and why is it as important to regard them as any other relations?

(2.) *The Moral Importance of Duties to the Holy Ghost.*

What is the revealed office of the Holy Spirit, and what text expresses our need of it?

How does all analogy show the importance of using the proper means to obtain His assistance?

How is this importance enhanced by their revelation?

CONCLUSION. *Revealed Religion, therefore, presumptively of the very highest importance.*

On supposition that Christianity is either true or credible, what would it argue in us to treat it as a light matter?

On what supposition alone could it be justly esteemed of little consequence?

On supposition of its credibility, what obligations rests upon us? and what is the degree of this obligation?

And on supposition of its truth, what obligation rests upon us?

1st Deduction. REVEALED PRECEPTS MORAL AS WELL AS POSITIVE.

What is the design of here adding two deductions?

I. *Definition of both classes of Precepts.*

How are moral and positive precepts distinguishable in the view of reason?

How are they distinguishable in the view of revelation, or as related to external command?

[*Note.* How far does this distinction hold?

When may positive precepts be also moral, and how are they then distinguishable?]

Why doth not mere revelation itself denominate any duty, whether positive or moral?

2. *Examples of both from Revelation.*

What example is given of a positive duty which is partly rational and partly revealed?

What example is given of a moral duty which is partly revealed and partly rational?

And how may positive institutions be classified?

2d Deduction. REVEALED PRECEPTS MORE MORAL THAN POSITIVE.

What do the Scriptures teach concerning moral as compared with positive precepts?

1. *Moral and Positive Precepts to be cautiously compared.*

Why do positive precepts themselves in general have a moral element, and what example is given?

How far, then, should the two classes of duties be compared, and why is this caution needed?

2. *Moral Precepts to be preferred to Positive Precepts.*

What case is supposed in order to test their comparative importance?

(1.) *Logical Grounds of this Preference.*

What is the first reason given for this preference?

What reason for it is afforded by the design of positive institutions?

And what reason, by the nature of religious obedience?

Is this reasoning practical as well as logical?

(2.) *Practical Grounds of this Preference.*

(a.) *In the constitution of our moral nature.*

In what respect are moral and positive precepts on a level? and how does this appear?

But how has the Author of our nature so constituted us as to prefer the former?

(b.) *In the nature of the thing.*

How have mankind been prone to estimate positive rites in comparison with moral precepts?

But without any comparison between them, what does the nature of the thing abundantly show?

(3.) *Scriptural Grounds of this Preference.*

Is it absolutely necessary to determine this question?

And what are our means of determining it?

(a.) *In the general tenor of Scripture.*

What is the tenor of Scripture respecting it?

(b.) *In particular declarations of Scripture.*

When positive and moral precepts are mentioned together, how does Scripture treat the former?

In case the two interfere, what is thus intimated respecting the former and the latter?

(c.) *In the express teaching of our Lord.*

What considerations make our Lord's teaching upon this question especially needful and decisive?

In what two instances did He compare positive and moral precepts and expressly determine which is to have the preference?

(a.) *As delivered in the form of a proverb of general application.*

In what proverbial expression was this determination delivered?

What was the effect of this manner of speaking upon the decision?

Had the decision been applied only to the single instance of Sabbath observance, what might still have been argued?

As run up into a proverb, however, what is its applicability?

Why is justice, also, as well as merey, to be preferred to positive institutions?

(b.) *As enforced by its quotation from the Old Testament.*

How is it argued that the original text, as quoted and applied by our Lord, inculcated the preference of moral to positive precepts?

If this be not granted, how else may we certainly learn it?

3. *Positive Precepts, however, remain obligatory.*

What weakness of human nature arises on comparison of two things of unequal importance? and what, therefore, would it argue in us to make light of even positive institutions?

What general and particular grounds of their obligation are given?

General Caution. REVEALED RELIGION NOT TO BE PREJUDGED FROM THE GROUNDS OF NATURAL RELIGION.

What may now be inferred as to the duty of reason towards revelation?

In our human interpretation of the Scriptures, what may be conceded to natural religion?

But what must still be maintained as to any doctrine or precept of revealed religion?

THE PROBABILITY OF A MIRACULOUS REVELATION.

(PART II. CHAP. II.)

After the positive argument before given, what two classes of objections are next to be considered? And what reason is given for observing this order?

What presumption is commonly supposed to lay against the Christian miracles as compared with other events?

How is this presumption to be estimated, and why should it here be considered?

I. NO RATIONAL PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVEALED RELIGION.

What is the general scheme of Christianity?

How is the question, whether such a system is miraculous or not, to be regarded?

In this view, on what two grounds alone could the analogy of nature raise any presumption against it?

(I.) *No Presumption against it as Undiscoverable.*

What two faculties are named as means of discovery?

(1.) *The Natural System but partially discovered.*

What case is supposed to show the limitation of reason and experience?

How would such a person be likely to estimate his ignorance and need of a revelation?

(2.) *The Natural System not fully discoverable.*

What is evident as to the actual extent of the scheme of nature?

And what is probable as to the comparative extent of that part of it which is open to our view?

How does this reasoning refute the alleged presumption against the truth and reality of the revealed system?

(II.) *No Presumption against it as Unanalogous.*

What is the second of the two presumptions to be considered?

(1.) *A Revealed System might be wholly Unanalogous.*

Why cannot we presume that things revealable must be like things known.

(2.) *The Natural System itself contains things Unanalogous.*

Why ought we not to wonder at any unlikeness between things visible and invisible?

(3.) *The Revealed System will be found sufficiently Analogous.*

What will appear on comparison of the Scheme of Christianity with the Scheme of Nature?

II. NO RATIONAL PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A MIRACULOUS REVELATION OF RELIGION.

What is the notion of a miracle, as stated by divines?

What other, and different, class of miracles is mentioned?

Is a revealed system, like Christianity, necessarily miraculous?

But how is revelation itself to be regarded?

(I.) *No Presumption against a Primitive Revelation, prior to the present order of nature.*

What is the first of the two presumptions which may be brought against a miraculous revelation?

(1.) *A Revelation at Creation not strictly Miraculous.*

What is implied in the very notion of a miracle relative to a course of nature?

Why, then, could there have been no miracle at the beginning of the world? or, at least, why cannot we tell if there could have been one?

What follows as to the nature of the question of a primitive revelation?

And how does it compare with the other facts of antiquity? What example is given?

(2.) *A Revelation at Creation no more incredible than Creation itself.*

What was the power exerted in creation as related to the present course of nature?

If we suppose that power was exerted still further in giving a revelation, what will be the nature of the question?

If we suppose that power to have been miraculous, why will not the question be any different?

How is this illustrated by the miraculous power of our Saviour?

(3.) *A Revelation at Creation a fully attested fact.*

What evidence of a primitive revelation is afforded by tradition and history?

What evidence of it is afforded by the first ages?

Is this evidence sufficient, without that of the Scriptures?

How does it bear upon the question of a subsequent revelation?

(II.) *No Presumption against a Subsequent Revelation, interrupting the present order of nature.*

What presumption remains to be considered?

GENERAL PROOF. *A Revelation since Creation not Impossible.*

What is needed, before we can even argue the question of a revelation miraculously introduced into our world?

What alone would be a parallel case from which to reason?

What would be the value of the presumptive proof afforded by one such case?

PARTICULAR PROOF. *A Revelation since Creation not Incredible.*

(1.) *Ordinary facts before proof are only less incredible than miracles.*

How is the presumption against common truths or facts overcome?

What is the degree of the presumption against the story of Cæsar or of any other man?

What supposition is made to show that unproved common facts are almost as readily doubted as miracles?

What is the only material question as to the matter before us?

(2.) *There might be natural reasons for miracles which do not exist for ordinary facts.*

Apart from religion, how far are we acquainted with the causes or reasons of the present course of nature?

What is supposable in regard to it during the lapse of six thousand years?

Prior to evidence, which would be the more credible, such needed miracles or mere ordinary facts?

(3.) *There certainly are moral or religious reasons for miracles which do not exist for ordinary facts.*

What particular reasons for miracles are afforded by the moral or religious system of the world?

How does this render the supposition of miraculous interpositions credible?

(4.) *Some natural facts, before proof, are really more incredible than any miracles.*

With what class of natural phenomena ought miracles to be compared, and what examples are given?

How could we determine that miracles are no more incredible than the marvels of magnetism or electricity?

What are the three conclusions as to the credibility of miracles, from the foregoing argument?

THE PROBABILITY OF A PARADOXICAL REVELATION.

(PART II. CHAP. III.)

What two classes of objections are brought against Christianity?

What examples are given of objections against its substance or system?

What particular objections are brought against the style of the Scriptures?

Why are the prophetic Scriptures especially so scornfully treated?

What is the general sweeping answer to all such objections, and how are they to be estimated comparatively?

PRELIMINARY CAUTIONS.

1. *Reason not to be villified.*

Why should we be cautious how we villify reason?

How can a supposed revelation be proved false by a reason?

Might anything else than the two things specified prove it false?

Allowing this province of reason, what is still to be maintained?

2. *Reason herself not to villify.*

What two reasons are given why it would be unreasonable to cavil at the proposed argument on account of any unacceptable consequences?

I. THE INCOMPETENCY OF REASON TO PREJUDGE A REVEALED RELIGION.

What is the scheme of nature, and how is it made known to us?

What is the corresponding scheme of Providence, and how is it made known to us?

What are the points of resemblance between the two schemes, and what is the analogical argument to be drawn from them?

1. *An A Priori Philosophy of Religion as impossible as an A Priori Philosophy of Nature.*

What is the experienced course of nature as compared with what might have been expected, before experience?

And what may thence be inferred as to the revealed dispensation?

Why is it supposable beforehand that in our preconceptions of it we should fall into infinite follies and mistakes?

Is there any ground to expect that it should appear to us clear of objections?

2. *An A Priori Philosophy of Revelation as impossible as an A Priori Philosophy of Science.*

How is it to be shown that this incompetency of reason to prejudge Christianity in general extends to inspiration or revelation in particular?

In what several respects are we incompetent to prejudge anything respecting natural knowledge?

(1.) *As to the Amount of Knowledge given.*

Why could we not tell beforehand anything as to the amount of revealed knowledge?

(2.) *As to its Transmission to Posterity.*

Why cannot we prejudge anything as to the qualifications of the sacred writers?

(3.) *As to the Extent of its Evidence.*

Why cannot we tell whether its evidence would be certain or doubtful, universal or local?

(4.) *As to its Historic Development.*

Why could we not tell whether it would be unfolded at once or gradually?

But could not we tell whether it should be written or oral, kept pure from age to age, or for a time corrupted?

Objection. That we are at least competent to judge of the fitness of a revelation to its own purpose.

On which of these points, especially, do we seem competent to prejudge a revelation?

Would a different revelation from the present necessarily have been a failure?

Why could we not determine beforehand anything as to the divine purposes of a revelation?

Why, then, are all *a priori* objections against a revelation frivolous?

1st Inference. The Paramount Authority of a Real Revelation.

What is, and what is not, the question to be decided concerning Christianity, and concerning the Scriptures?

In what case alone would obscurity, ambiguity, or diverse interpretations of the Scriptures be valid objections against them?

What are the only valid objections which could be brought against them?

While any proof of miracles and prophecies remains can their practical authority be overthrown?

2d Inference. The Paramount Authority of the Language of Scripture.

What follows, also, as to the Scriptures as compared with other writings?

Why cannot we argue that the language is obscure or figurative, because difficult of comprehension?

What is the reason of this difference?

And what is the only proper question as to the language of Scripture?

Objection. That Internal Improbabilities weaken External Proof.

How is this objection shown to be impractical and founded on our ignorance?

II. THE LIABILITY OF A REVEALED RELIGION TO OBJECTIONS FROM REASON.

What has become self evident in respect to all *a priori* objections from reason?

Yet what does analogy teach in respect to revelation, however really unexceptionable it may be?

1. *Natural Knowledge as Paradoxical as Revealed Knowledge.*

Prior to experience, in what respects would men probably object to natural knowledge?

(1.) *As to its Disproportions.*

How is it illustrated by our astronomical as compared with our medical knowledge?

(2.) *As to the Faculty of its Acquisition.*

How is it illustrated by the faculty of invention?

(3.) *As to the Method of its Communication.*

How is it shown by the imperfections of language?

(4.) *As to its Certitude.*

How is it shown by the comparative sagacity of men and brutes?

What is to be inferred as to revealed knowledge?

Are the objections against it at all greater than might have been expected?

Example. Natural Endowments as Paradoxical as Supernatural Endowments.

What is the general objection brought against the manner in which the miraculous gifts of the apostolic age were exercised, and by what supposed analogy is it to be refuted?

What are the more particular objections brought against the miraculous endowments themselves?

How are such objections refuted by the incompetency of reason, by the ordinary conferments of Providence, and by the analogy of our natural education?

2. *Scientific Knowledge and Theological Knowledge Analogous.*

What is practical Christianity as distinguished from theology, and to what is it likened?

(1.) *As to their Processes.*

What is required in the study of the doctrinal and prophetic Scriptures as well as in natural and civil science?

(2.) *As to their Hindrances*

What is said of the hindrances of both kinds of knowledge?

(3.) *As to their Imperfect Development.*

What must be owned as to our knowledge of the Scriptures?

How might it be instantly completed? and when?

(4.) *As to their Means of Increase.*

What are the means of increase for both?

(5.) *As to their Prospect of Increase.*

Why is it not incredible that our knowledge of the Scriptures should be so limited?

How may it have been intended that new light should be shed upon the Scriptures?

1st Objection. That Science is of little Consequence.

(1.) *The Objection Irrelevant.*

What is the exact point of the analogy?

In what respect must natural knowledge be admitted to be important?

(2.) *The Objection refuted by the Analogy of Providential Gifts.*

If the analogy fails on this point, how can it be supplied?

2d Objection. That Revelation, as a great Spiritual Remedy, is largely a failure.

In what respects does Christianity, as a spiritual remedy, seem objectionable?

(1.) *The Objection refuted by the analogy of Natural Remedies.*

How is it shown that natural remedies are neither universal in their prevalence, nor perfect in their nature, nor certain in their application?

(2.) *The Objection reducible to an Absurdity.*

To what absurdity would the objection lead?

And how does our experience expose this absurdity?

III. THE TRUE PROVINCE OF REASON IN JUDGING OF A REVELATION.

Why cannot we then infer that reason is in no respect to judge of a revelation?

1. REASON A PROPER CRITIC OF ITS MEANING.

Should reason judge of its meaning?

Of what else can, and should it judge?

2. REASON A PROPER CRITIC OF ITS MORALITY.

What is, and what is not, meant by judging of the morality of Scripture?

On what ground may the general morality of Scripture be vindicated against objections?

Exception. The Supposed Immorality of some Particular Precepts.

What precepts in Scripture seem to be of this nature?

(1.) *Such Precepts not Contrary to Immutable Morality.*

How do such precepts affect the nature of the action?

In what case would this be otherwise?

How is this illustrated?

(2.) *Such Precepts too Exceptional to be of an Immoral Tendency.*

What would be the effect of a course of apparently immoral acts with out such precepts, and why do not such precepts have this effect?

(3.) *Such Precepts Difficult only to the Weak or Wicked.*

What is the only difficulty in them?

Why are objections on this ground not tenable?

3. REASON A PROPER CRITIC OF ITS EVIDENCE.

How far is reason a proper judge of the evidence of revealed religion?

1ST CONCLUSION. *Reason, therefore, no Proper Critic of a Revealed System of Religion as distinguished from its Evidence.*

What is the question upon which the truth of Christianity depends?

How are objections against its system, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, to be estimated? and why?

(1.) *Rationalistic Criticism, when applied to the natural system, is found inconclusive.*

How does this way of objecting appear when applied to the constitution of nature?

Into what misleading principles and suppositions is it resolvable?

(2.) *Rationalistic Criticism, when applied to the Christian System, will be found inconclusive.*

How will this way of objecting appear when applied to the Christian System, in detail? and by what means will it be refuted?

2D CONCLUSION. *Reason, however, a Proper Critic of the Internal Evidence afforded by a Revealed System of Religion.*

How might a supposed revelation contain within itself presumptive evidence of its truth?

And why are we competent judges of such evidence?

THE PROBABLE WISDOM AND GOODNESS OF A REVEALED SYSTEM OF RELIGION.

(PART II. CHAP. IV.)

What has been shown as to all *a priori* objections to revelation?

Why, however, may it be said that this is but a partial or unsatisfactory answer to them?

How is it proposed to meet all objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian System?

What are the three heads of the analogical argument for the perfection of the Christian System?

I. THE REVEALED SYSTEM, LIKE THE NATURAL, IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.

How is the general moral government of God exercised, and to what ends?

How is Christianity related to it?

1. *Christianity a System or Scheme.*

What are the nature, object, and extent of Christianity?

What are the parts of this scheme as related to Christ?

What are the parts of it as respects the Holy Ghost?

How is it to be completed in the final judgment?

(2.) *The Christian Scheme Incomprehensible.*

What do the Scriptures expressly assert respecting this scheme?

What is the effect of reading any passage relating to it?

How does the extent of it, as far as revealed, compare with the known extent of nature?

And what follows as to all objections against either the perfection of Christianity or of Nature?

II. THE REVEALED SYSTEM, LIKE THE NATURAL, IS ONE IN WHICH ENDS ARE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH MEANS.

How are ends accomplished both in Nature and in Providence?

What class of objections against either are refuted by this view? and how does it refute them?

Why is the apparent foolishness of some means no presumption against them?

III. THE REVEALED SYSTEM, LIKE THE NATURAL, IS ONE IN WHICH ENDS ARE ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS OF LAWS.

1. *Universality of Law in Nature.*

How is the whole common course of nature said to be carried on?

How far does our actual knowledge of natural laws extend?

What meteorological and geological phenomena have not yet been reduced to laws?

What psychological and social phenomena have not yet been reduced to laws?

How do we show our ignorance of such phenomena in our manner of speaking of them?

What, however, do all reasonable men conclude respecting them? and on what ground do they thus conclude?

2. *Corresponding Universality of Law in Providence*

On the same ground, what may we conclude as to God's miraculous interpositions?

What examples are instanced? and how is it shown that our ignorance of the laws regulating such cases is no objection against the existence of such laws?

How is it shown that unprovided exigencies might arise under such a supernatural system, and yet be no objection to its wisdom and goodness?

Conclusion. That the Scheme of Christianity is as Unobjectionable as the Scheme of Nature.

To what is the appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in nature owing?

Is there any more reason why Nature should be a scheme than why Christianity should?

What makes it credible that Christianity should be a scheme carried on by general laws?

How does this repel all objections to its wisdom and goodness?

GENERAL OBJECTION. THAT IN THE CHRISTIAN SCHEME, THE ENDS ARE ACCOMPLISHED BY TARDY AND INTRICATE MEANS.

What two classes of general objections against Christianity have now been obviated?

How are the particular objections to be answered?

How does the first of them partake of a general character?

What kind of means does this objection attribute to the Christian scheme?

1. *The Objection proceeds from ignorance in regard to the whole subject of Means and Ends.*

What is certain in this matter, both as to Nature and Christianity?

What alone do we know respecting it, and of what are we greatly ignorant?

What may be the character of all our conceptions of it? and why?

2. *The Objection is refuted by the whole Analogy of Nature.*

What kind of a scheme or system is the whole natural world, and what kind of means are used to accomplish its ends?

What examples of this are brought from the material world?

What examples are brought from human experience?

3. *The Objection only illustrates the Infinite Wisdom of the Author of Nature and Christianity.*

Wherein does the Author of Nature appear to differ from men in His mode of procedure?

How does the plan of nature require such a mode of procedure?

How is it shown that gradation and progression characterize the whole universe?

THE PROBABILITY OF THE REVEALED SYSTEM OF REDEMPTION.

(PART II. CHAP. V.)

How is the Mediation of Christ commonly viewed by objectors ?

I. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND NATURAL MEDIATION.

What is the effect of the whole analogy of nature as to the general notion of a Mediator ?

How does this principle appear in the birth and nurture of all living creatures ?

How far does it prevail in the visible government of God ?

What is supposable, also, as to its prevalence in the invisible government of God ?

How, then, does our experience show that there is no natural objection to the Christian doctrine of a Mediator ?

II. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND NATURAL PUNISHMENT AS TO MODE OF SEQUENCE.

What article of natural religion is presupposed in the doctrine of the world's redemption ?

What is necessarily implied as to future punishments under the Divine government ?

Is it supposable that we should know precisely how or why such punishments shall follow ?

In what way may we, without absurdity, suppose them to follow ? according to the analogy of what examples ?

What may lead to such natural sequence of future punishment, and how is it illustrated ?

Objection. That this is taking the execution of justice out of the hands of God and giving it to Nature.

Why are such natural punishments to be regarded as due to the Author of Nature, and to what are they ascribed in the Scriptures?

What must be admitted in regard to the sequence of future punishments, and what is it allowable to suppose respecting it for the sake of illustration?

III. THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME DIVINE PREVENTION OF FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

What provision do we find in Nature and Providence as to the bad natural consequences of men's actions?

1. *Such a Probability favored by the actual constitution of Nature.*

(1.) *Goodness as well as Severity in Nature.*

How are we apt to imagine the world might have been constituted?

What, however, is its actual constitution, and how are both severity and goodness displayed in it?

How can a former illustration be used to show this?

What two means does the general constitution of the world afford for preventing the natural consequences of men's follies?

(2.) *Compassion as well as Goodness in Nature.*

What different constitution of the world may be supposed? and would it have been really evil or good?

What, then, besides mere general goodness does its actual constitution display?

What hope as to the ruinous consequences of vice does analogy warrant? and to what extent?

2. *Such a Probability, however, could not amount to a Certainty.*

How will many regard this question, and to what is their feeling to be attributed?

(1.) *Evil Consequences of mere Irregularity.*

How can it be shown that mere rashness, neglect, or wilfulness will be attended with bad consequences?

To what are such consequences proportioned?

(2.) *Greater Evil Consequences of Irreligion.*

How is it shown that there is no comparison between mere irregularity and irreligion as to their evil consequences?

Do such consequences issue only in the future world?

Why, then, is it by no means intuitively certain that they could be prevented?

What, however, would there be large ground to hope?

IV. THE IMPROBABILITY OF ANY HUMAN PREVENTION OF FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

Yet could anything we might do prevent punishment?

1. *Such Human Prevention at least not Certain.*

Why cannot this be thought certain?

Why cannot we know whether anything we might do would make it fit to remit punishment?

Why cannot we know whether anything we might do would be sufficient to prevent punishment?

2. *Such Human Prevention contrary to the Analogy of Providence.*

How far will analogy go in settling this question?

What examples are given to show that mere sorrow and reformation will not prevent the natural consequences of misconduct?

How does the misconduct of men affect their natural abilities or their need of the assistance of others?

What, then, is the argument *a fortiori* against the sufficiency of mere repentance or reformation to prevent future punishment?

But does misbehavior in the higher capacity render repentance or reformation useless?

3. *Such Human Prevention contrary to all our notions of Government.*

How ought we to reason concerning the Divine conduct?

Yet why cannot we suppose that reformation might prevent judicial punishments?

If we suppose it could in some cases, could we determine in what cases, or in what degree?

By whom is the efficacy of mere repentance to prevent such punishment insisted on, and what custom shows this notion to be contrary to the general sense of mankind?

What, then, must be our general conclusion as to the future punishment?

V. THE REVEALED SYSTEM OF PREVENTION THROUGH THE MEDIATION OF CHRIST.

In this state of the question, what recourse have we?

1. *This Revealed System complementary to the Natural System.*

What natural fear does revelation confirm?

How does it confirm the teaching of nature as to the state of the world, and the efficacy of repentance?

What just hope of nature does it also confirm?

How does it complete the lessons of God's experienced government, and what merciful provision in His more general government does it disclose?

2. *This Revealed System Analogous to the Natural System.*

What does Scripture teach as to the Love of God for the world?

To what in His natural Providence is this analogous? but in what respect does the analogy fail? ~

What does Scripture teach as to Christ's love for us, and to what does He himself compare it?

Are such comparisons complete?

What was the real object of Christ's interposition as related to the divine appointments or the general laws of the divine government?

[*Note.*] *This Revealed System, however, far transcends the Natural System.*

What question is left untouched by this discussion?

What two questions are cited from a class of questions which ought carefully to be kept out of it?

What is the answer to the first, and the general answer to both of them?

How should the inquiry, What would have followed if God had not done as he has, be regarded?

1st Objection. That this system seems inconsistent with the Divine Goodness.

By what *a fortiori* argument is this objection refuted?

2d Objection. That this system supposes mankind to be naturally in a very strange state.

Granting the fact, why is it no argument against Christianity?

What particular considerations prove it to be a fact, even if unaccountable?

What is the Scripture account of the origin of the fact, and to what other fact is it analogous in nature and revelation?

VI. THE OFFICE OF CHRIST AS MEDIATOR IN THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD.

In what particular manner did Christ interpose, and between what parties?

1. *The Scriptural Account of Christ's Mediatorial Office.*

What Scripture phrases severally represent Him as a Revealer of the Divine Will, a Propitious Sacrifice, and a Voluntary Offering?

What is the Scriptural proof of the two latter characters especially?

Objection That Christ's Sacrificial Character is merely figurative or typical.

(1.) *The Mosaic Sacrifices are described as mere types of the Atonement.*

What texts prove the ancient sacrifices typical rather than real?

What texts prove the sacrifice of Christ real rather than typical?

(2.) *The Atonement is described variously as having an efficacy beyond mere instruction or example.*

What texts prove the efficacy of Christ's death and suffering?

What are the texts which describe Him as our Ransom, Advocate, and Propitiation?

What texts describe His Humiliation, Exaltation, and Worship in Heaven?

2. *The Theological Definition of Christ's Mediatorial Office.*

Under what three heads is Christ's Mediatorial office usually treated by divines?

(1.) *The Office of Christ as Prophet.*

How is Christ pre-eminently the Prophet?

How does He execute this office in respect to truths of natural religion?

In respect to what truths of revealed religion was He a prophet as no other ever was?

And how did He practically illustrate His teachings?

(2.) *The Office of Christ as King.*

What is the nature of Christ's Kingdom?

With what design did He found a Church?

What kind of government does he exercise over that part of it which is militant here on earth?

Who are the members of this church?

What are His purposes respecting it and its enemies?

3. *The Office of Christ as Priest.*

How did Christ execute the office of a Priest?

How did Expiatory Sacrifices arise among the Jews and other nations?

What part have they fulfilled in the religion of mankind?

How did the sacrifice of Christ differ from them, and in what may it be compared with them?

(1.) *The Efficacy of Christ's Sacrifice inexplicable.*

Do we know how the ancients understood sacrifices to become efficacious.

How have the Scriptures rendered all conjectures about it uncertain?

Why has no one any reason to complain of this?

(2.) *The Efficacy of Christ's Sacrifice nevertheless Unquestionable.*

What opposite extremes have been pursued in this question?

Besides teaching the efficacy of repentance, how did Christ render it efficacious?

Besides revealing salvation, how did he put us in a capacity of salvation?

What is the part of wisdom in practically dealing with the question?

VII. THE FUTILITY OF A PRIORI OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM OF REDEMPTION.

(1.) *Such Objections proceed from our own Ignorance.*

By what considerations is it shown that we are not competent judges, before revelation, of the necessity of a Mediator?

How is it shown that we are no better judges of the office of a Mediator?

What follows as to any objections urged against the expediency or usefulness of particular parts of His office?

In what case alone might such objections have a show of reason?

Exception. That the Doctrine of Vicarious Punishment appears to be neither requisite nor suitable.

What objection appears to be of this positive kind? And how is it stated?

(1.) *Vicarious Punishments occur in Natural Providence as well as in Christianity.*

How is it shown that the objection to them concludes as much against natural providence as against Christianity?

Does their infinitely greater importance in Christianity vitiate this analogy?

Why is the objection even stronger against Natural Providence than against Christianity?

(2.) *Vicarious Punishments may be necessary to the completion of the Divine Government.*

How may vicarious punishments be consistent with the doctrine that every one shall finally receive according to his personal deserts?

a. Their Usefulness in Natural Providence.

How does the necessity or occasion for them arise?

What provision has God made for their occurrence?

Why are not men shocked by them, as they appear in daily life, and why do they object to them as they appear in Christ?

What do they ignorantly conclude must be the only manner in which the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the redemption of the world?

b. Their Tendency to Vindicate Divine Justice.

What apparent natural tendency in vicarious punishments has been urged in defence of the doctrine?

How is this argument to be estimated?

(3.) *Vicarious Punishments, even if inscrutable, might be requisite and suitable.*

Is this an objection against Christianity, or against the whole constitution of nature?

How is its futility shown from our ignorance?

(II.) *Such Objections end in Presumption and Folly.*

How are objections of this kind viewed by reasonable men?

How far is such reasoning legitimate, and when is it infinitely absurd?

How does our own experience increase the folly of such objections?

What issue is made between reason and revelation in regard to them?

What heightens the absurdity of them in the present case?

(III.) *Such Objections are wholly Irrelevant and Inexcusable.*

What should reason and analogy teach us not to expect in regard to the divine conduct as compared with our own duty?

(1.) *Natural Providence as Mysterious as the Christian Dispensation.*

How, and what, does God teach us concerning our conduct?

In what respect is such instruction sufficient?

How much of natural providence does it disclose?

How is it shown that the same is the case with regard to the Christian Dispensation?

In what, then, are the Natural and Christian Dispensations analogous, and what information has been given under them respectively?

(2.) *The Christian Precepts are sufficiently Evident.*

If there were anything unaccountable in the Christian precepts, why would they still be obligatory?

What, however, is the fact respecting them?

What reasons exist for positive institutions?

What reasons exist for our duties to Christ?

THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES.

(PART II. CHAP. VI.)

What objection has been brought against the evidence of religion, and upon what supposition?

What kindred objection as to the diffusion of religion has also been insisted on?

I. THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES ARE OBJECTED TO ON ABSURD GROUNDS.

How may the weakness of these opinions be shown?

On what absurd propositions are they respectively founded?

How, and to what extent, are these suppositions contradicted?

II. THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES ARE NOT WITHOUT ANALOGY.

1. *Such Deficiencies exist around us under present Providence.*

(I.) *Natural Evidence as doubtful as Religious Evidence.*

How are those who object to the evidence of religion as doubtful to be answered?

a. *Doubtfulness as to what is our true temporal interest.*

What makes it difficult to decide in regard to many an object of temporal pursuit?

What renders it doubtful whether we could enjoy it if obtained?

b. *Doubtfulness as to the most probable means of attaining our true temporal interest.*

How may our best concerted schemes be disappointed?

What kind of objections often render them extremely doubtful?

c. *Doubtfulness as to Eventual Success.*

To what deceits are we liable, both from without and from within?

Yet how do men act in view of such doubtful evidence?

(II.) *Natural Benefits as unequally distributed as Religious Benefits.*

How are those who object to the lack of universality in revelation to be answered?

How does the Author of Nature appear to bestow his gifts among his creatures? and what examples are given?

To what is the variety of human characters and conditions likened?

Yet does this disprove a divine government or affect human conduct under it?

2. *Such Deficiencies, in different degrees, have existed under past Providence.*

(1.) *Revelation has hitherto had different degrees of diffusion.*

How is it shown that neither the Jewish nor the Christian revelation has been universal?

(2.) *Revelation has hitherto had different degrees of evidence.*

What different degrees of evidence have existed under the Jewish revelation?

What different degrees of evidence have existed under the Christian revelation?

What different degrees may still arise?

3. *Such Deficiencies, in any supposable degrees, would not be beyond the Analogy of Providence.*

(1.) *Any supposable degrees of evidence of revelation would not be beyond this Analogy.*

What varieties of religious conviction are supposed to prevail?

What varieties of religious enlightenment are supposed to have been intended?

To what would all this be analogous?

(2.) *Any supposable degrees of diffusion of revelation would not be beyond this Analogy.*

What portions of mankind may be supposed to have been wholly without revelation?

What portions may be supposed to have had natural religion, without a genuine complete revelation?

What portions may be supposed to have had the true revelation interpolated and corrupted?

What portions may be supposed to be in some ignorance, even under a true, full, and pure revelation?

To what would all this be analogous?

III. THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES ARE NOT INEQUITABLE.

Why is there nothing shocking or unjust in all this various economy of Providence?

To what are our scruples on this point due?

How much will be expected of every one, and how is this expressed in Scripture language?

What wrong inference, however, should be avoided?

What shows the absurdity of refusing to make efforts to better our religious condition?

IV. THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES ARE NOT PECULIARLY UNACCOUNTABLE.

1. *The General Explanation of such Deficiencies.*

Upon what principle is it reasonable to suppose the Author of Nature was led thus to place the same kind of creatures in different situations?

How may we also explain His having placed creatures of like moral capacities in different religious situations?

And to what is the various religious conditions, at different periods, of the same creatures analogous?

2. *The Particular Explanation of such Deficiencies.*

Why is it difficult to explain in particular these religious diversities?

How are they implied in the constitution of this world?

Were revelation universal, what might still give rise to them?

Is it any more difficult to account for them than to account for our ignorance respecting them?

V. THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES, SO FAR AS THEY ARE NOT MEN'S OWN FAULT, MAY BE ONLY INCIDENT TO A STATE OF PROBATION.

(1.) *Want of Obviousness in the Christian Evidences before examination, may afford Probation.*

How may the lack of self-evidence in religion constitute a moral trial of the understanding?

(a.) *Such Intellectual Probation is as probable as any more Practical Probation.*

What renders this antecedently probable?

How is it shown that intellectual probation is as possible before conviction as more practical probation after conviction?

What intellectual vices or virtues may be practical before conviction? and to what may they be compared?

(b.) *Such Intellectual Probation is as decisive as any more Practical Probation.*

What is there in the evidence of religion that constitutes probation? and to what extent?

(2.) *Supposed Doubtfulness in the Christian Evidences after examination, may afford probation.*

What is the effect of even doubtful evidence upon an inquirer into religion?

(A.) *Such Doubtfulness involves accountability proportioned to the importance of religion.*

How is the obligation imposed by doubt illustrated?

How is the absurdity of any contrary view shown?

(a.) *Doubtfulness in other relations does not free from accountability.*

How is the obligation imposed by doubt illustrated?

How is the absurdity of any contrary view shown?

(b.) *Doubtfulness, in religion, involves peculiar accountability.*

If Christianity should seem only supposable or credible, what ought to be the effect on the mind?

What moral tempers does an apprehension of its truth oblige men to cultivate?

How should it affect their outward behavior toward religion?

In what respect would such behavior of doubting persons be like that of fully convinced persons?

What consideration makes the rule of life very much the same for both?

How far do they differ and agree in this regard?

(c.) *Doubtfulness in influential persons involves more accountability than common behavior.*

What class of persons have it in their power to do more harm or good by their religious opinions than by their common intercourse?

Why are they doubly accountable for their behavior under the supposed doubtfulness of religious evidence?

(B.) *Such Doubtfulness involves accountability proportioned to the evidence of religion.*

(a.) *Degrees of Evidence are necessarily implied in doubt as well as in belief.*

How is it shown that where there is no evidence there is no doubt?

How is it shown that the case of an even chance involves evidence as well as doubt?

Relatively, what degrees of evidence are implied in doubt, belief, and certainty?

What degrees exist in the scale of evidence below as well as above the point of doubt?

(b.) *Degrees of Evidence, in proportion as they are discerned, should influence conduct.*

Can we distinguish the different degrees of evidence?

Why should they influence practice in proportion as they are discerned?

In what proportion are men enabled to discern evidence? and in what proportion to act upon it?

How is their treatment of evidence shown to involve practical as well as intellectual probation?

Considering, then, both the importance and the evidence of religion, what does doubting concerning it involve?

(3.) *Speculative Difficulties in the Christian Evidences may promote the disciplinary or educational ends of probation.*

By what analogy is it to be shown that difficulties in the evidence of religion afford no just ground of complaint?

(A.) *Such Speculative Difficulties are of like disciplinary tendency with External Temptations.*

How do temptations afford moral discipline and improvement?

How may want of obviousness in the evidence of religion serve as a temptation?

How may supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion serve as a temptation, practically as well as intellectually, and to what common temptation is it likened?

How may such supposed doubtfulness discipline the virtuous principle?

(B.) *Such Speculative Difficulties are no more unaccountable than External Difficulties.*

What, in general, is meant by temptation, and what purposes does it serve?

How may we account analogically for the difficulty of a want of obviousness in the evidence of religion?

How may we account for the difficulty of an appearing doubtfulness in that evidence?

How may we account for the combination of external with internal temptations in some persons?

(C.) *Such Speculative Difficulties may afford the peculiar discipline required by speculative natures.*

What are the chief temptations of the generality of mankind in respect to morality and religion?

What class of persons are described as not liable to such gross temptations?

(a.) *Speculative natures could not otherwise be fully disciplined.*

Why would religion, if self-evident, fail to be a discipline to such persons?

Yet how far might they stand in need of moral discipline?

Or what further design of probation might it be requisite for them to meet?

What, then, may be the peculiar and distinguishing trial of such persons?

(b.) *Speculative natures are so disciplined in common life.*

How are some persons, in their temporal capacity, situated with regard to prudent conduct?

What is the principal exercise of some persons in regard to conduct?

VI. THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES MAY BE LARGELY MEN'S OWN FAULT, AS WELL AS PART OF THEIR PROBATION.

What has hitherto been conceded in regard to men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion, but on what ground may the opposite be maintained?

(1.) *Want of Conviction by the Christian Evidences may be owing to neglect and levity.*

What persons are not likely to see the evidence of religion, however certain and demonstrable?

What persons are not likely to see that evidence of religion which really is seen by others?

(a.) *Neglect and levity have this effect naturally.*

What is the natural effect of neglect and levity in matters of common speculation and practice, as well as in religion?

Will the effect be the same if the neglect of evidence proceed from mere carelessness as from grosser vices?

Does it necessarily imply anything ludicrous in the truth itself?

(b.) *Neglect and levity may also have this effect providentially.*

In what further manner may neglect and levity prevent knowledge and conviction of moral and religious subjects?

What does Scripture declare on this point?

[*Note.* How is the same idea expressed in other Scriptures and by Grotius?]

Does it make any difference by what providential conduct this comes to pass?

(2.) *Want of Conviction cannot be owing to any practical insufficiency in the Christian Evidences themselves.*

(a.) *They are sufficient for common minds.*

To what class of common men is the general proof of natural and revealed religion level?

What only is required on their part?

How much of natural religion can they be convinced of?

How is Christianity related to their natural sense of things, and what supernatural evidences of it are they capable of seeing?

(b.) *They appear insufficient only to superficial objectors.*

How far are objections to this proof answerable, and who are capable of answering them?

What, however, does a thorough examination into such objections require?

If any, without such examination of them, take them at second hand, what must be the result? and to what will it be analogous?

OBJECTION. That the Author of religion would make its evidences as indubitable as the directions of a master to a servant.

Why is it supposed that a prince or master would take care that his directions should be well attested and plain?

(1.) *The alleged analogy is unwarrantable and contrary to experience.*

How is this objection shown to be unwarrantable and contrary to experience?

From whence is a full answer to the objection to be taken?

(a.) *Religion concerns the motives as well as externals of an action.*

Why would a prince give his directions so plainly? and in what respect is this no parallel case to that of morality and religion?

What must be supposed in order to make the cases parallel?

(b.) *Religion may express the conditional as well as absolute will of God.*

When may God's will respecting morality and religion be said to be absolute, and how, then, would we stand related to that will?

When may His will be considered as conditional, and to what extent are instances of it to be found?

CONCLUSION. That Doubtful Evidence may be only part of our Religious Probation is not incredible.

What is necessarily implied in a state of religion, and why, then, is there no peculiar incredibility in supposing the evidence of religion doubtful?

(1.) *Reason favors this Conclusion.*

If probation involved certain information and full conviction, what would be the only danger of miscarriage?

But is this the only equitable probation which, from the reason of the case, is possible?

If probation, then, involves ignorance and doubt, what is the peculiar danger of failure?

(2.) *Experience favors this Conclusion.*

How is it shown that in our temporal capacity probation involves ignorance and doubt, both as to our interest and our conduct?

And how does our experience prove such probation to be as decisive as one involving certain information and conviction?

How is the whole argument practically applied to such exceptions as disregard religion under pretence of insufficient evidence?

THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY ANALOGICALLY ESTIMATED.

(PART II. CHAP. VII.)

With what argumentative design is it proposed now to consider the positive evidences of Christianity?

DIVISION OF THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES INTO DIRECT AND COLLATERAL.

What are the two direct and fundamental proofs of Christianity?

How are other and collateral proofs to be treated?

What kind of an argument for Christianity do they afford, and to what may the conviction arising from it be compared?

How is it proposed to divide and treat the Evidence of Christianity?

SECTION I. DIRECT EVIDENCE.

I. MIRACLES.

I. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF MIRACLES.

1. *Historical Evidence from the Holy Scriptures.*

For what purpose were miracles wrought, and what kind of evidence of them is to be adduced?

(1.) *The Scriptural accounts of Miracles, as of natural events, are plain, unadorned narratives.*

What sort of evidence does the Old Testament afford of the miracles of Moses and the Prophets?

What sort of evidence of the miracles of Christ and the Apostles do the Gospels and Acts afford?

How might other historians have treated miracles, and how would we then naturally account for the introduction of them into a narrative?

But how are both miraculous and natural facts related in Scripture?

(2.) *The Scripture accounts of Miracles are quoted as genuine down to the present day.*

How is the genuineness of the Scripture accounts of miracles proved by quotations from them?

(3.) *The Scripture accounts of Miracles are confirmed by subsequent events.*

How may common history, and the common Scripture history be greatly confirmed?

To what extent may the miraculous history in Scripture be thus confirmed, and by what events?

What is the only satisfactory account of the establishment of the Jewish and Christian Religions?

(4.) *The Scripture accounts of Miracles are themselves most easily explained on supposition of their truthfulness.*

What is the most obvious and direct way of accounting for the existence and general reception of this miraculous history itself?

What may be conceded in regard to a less obvious and direct explanation, but what cannot be conceded?

How far will mere supposition and possibility go as proof against historical evidence?

(5.) *The Scripture accounts of Miracles are, therefore, to be accepted until positively disproved.*

Though all this historical evidence were but doubtful, yet how should it be treated?

What three kinds of counter proof would alone be sufficient to invalidate it?

2. *Historical Evidence of Miracles from St. Paul's Epistles.*

What are the proofs of the genuineness of St. Paul's writings, and how are they to be estimated?

What particular proof of the genuineness of his Epistle to the Corinthians is mentioned?

(1.) *They afford detached and independent evidence.*

How is it shown from the Apostle's own declaration, and the history in the Acts, that his testimony is to be considered as independent of the other Apostles?

(2.) *They afford peculiarly credible evidence.*

How do his Epistles show that miraculous works and gifts were publicly known among his readers?

What was his design in bringing forward the subject of miraculous gifts?

How does his manner of speaking of those gifts prove their actual existence at the time?

3. *Historical Evidence of Miracles from the success of Christianity as a Miraculous Religion.*

On what allegation or pretence did Christianity offer itself to the world, and on what belief was it actually received?

(1.) *Miracles were the peculiar Credentials of Christianity.*

How far was Christianity distinguishable from other religions in this respect?

To what extent can it be said that Mahometanism was not at first propagated by miracles?

How is it shown that the alleged miracles of Paganism and Popery are not parallel cases?

How did Christianity differ from them in the manner of its rise and progress?

(2.) *Miracles were universally credited by the first Christian converts.*

What fact is allowed in regard to the introduction of Christianity into the world? and what would its first converts have alleged as their reason for embracing it?

What were the difficulties in the way of their conversion? and what did their conversion show as to their own belief and testimony in regard to miracles?

(3.) *Miracles are thus proved by circumstantial as well as direct historical evidence.*

How does this testimony of their conduct compare with written testimony?

Why is it to be accepted as real evidence?

How is it shown to be, at the same time, distinct from the direct historical evidence of the sacred writers?

Why cannot this general belief in the Christian miracles be attributed to the credulity of mankind?

What difficulties then stood in the way of belief in Christianity?

What is the presumption from the immediate conversion of such numbers, and how is it to be valued?

II. THE FUTILITY OF INFIDEL OBJECTIONS AGAINST THIS HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF MIRACLES.

Upon whom does it lie to bring objections against this evidence?

What, however, is the proper question in regard to it?

What course have unbelievers taken?

1ST INFIDEL OBJECTION. *That the primitive Christians might have been mere enthusiasts deceived into a belief in Miracles.*

How is it alleged that enthusiasts often act in regard to the most idle follies imaginable?

(1.) *The Objection assumes that miracles are matters of opinion rather than of fact.*

What distinction is overlooked in this objection?

How do facts differ from opinions in respect to testimony?

What is the strongest proof any one could give of his believing facts or opinions?

How did the Apostles show their belief in miracles, and why must their belief be admitted as proof of them?

What was the peculiar proof of them given by the martyrs of the next age?

(2.) *The Objection assumes that enthusiasm could destroy testimony to matters of fact.*

What is alleged to be the effect of enthusiasm upon testimony even for facts in religion?

(a.) *Enthusiasm might destroy testimony to things incredible or unproved.*

What kind of testimony is the strongest evidence we can have for any matter of fact?

In what two ways might such testimony be overcome?

And in that case how alone could such testimony be accounted for?

But in the absence of intrinsic incredibility or counter testimony, how is such an explanation to be regarded?

(b.) *Enthusiasm could not destroy testimony to the Christian Religion.*

How is such an explanation of testimony to be regarded when the things attested are credible and fully proved?

How has it been shown that the testimony to Christian revelation cannot thus be explained?

(c.) *Enthusiasm and other like influences do not destroy testimony in common matters.*

To what influence is religion supposed to be peculiarly liable?

What influences akin to enthusiasm affect men in common matters?

Why are they to be considered as of a like kind to enthusiasm?

Yet what is the effect of human testimony, notwithstanding?

2D INFIDEL OBJECTION. *That the primitive Christians might have been enthusiastic impostors, deceiving others as well as themselves into a belief in miracles.*

How is it supposed that the Apostles might have deceived themselves as well as others? and why is this thought to be credible?

(1.) *Such impostures are confessedly not impossible.*

What is conceded to be the testimony of observation and Scripture in regard to the possibility of such enthusiastic impostures?

But what is the inconsistency of the objector?

(2.) *Such impostures do not destroy actual testimony.*

How is it shown that men are naturally protected against impostures, and yet at the same time liable to countenance them?

But what is the natural effect of human testimony notwithstanding?

(3.) *Such impostures are not in fact peculiar to religion.*

If it is objected farther that in point of fact mankind has been strangely deluded by pretences to miracles, what may be replied?

(4.) *Such impostures, however strongly supported by historical evidence, cannot invalidate the Christian Religion.*

What further objection is added to prove the Christian miracles impostures?

Is it to be admitted that the historical evidence for fabulous miracles is like that for the Christian?

If this were allowed, why would it be absurd to bring it as an objection against the Christian miracles?

How is this absurdity illustrated?

1st General Answer to both Infidel Objections. Enthusiasm and Imposture at worst could only weaken the miraculous evidence of Christianity.

In what proportionable degrees will these things confessedly weaken the evidence of testimony?

But what two things alone could destroy such evidence?

In the absence of such counter proof, why must that evidence be admitted?

How do those who bring forward the mere general fallibility of human nature against this historical evidence expose the weakness of their own position?

2d General Answer. Enthusiasm and Imposture are largely precluded by the very nature of Christianity.

How does the importance of Christianity heighten the testimony of its first converts?

How also do the moral obligations it imposed upon them make a peculiar presumption in favor of their testimony?

CONCLUSION. Even Infidels must admit the Miraculous Evidence of Christianity to be considerable.

What is the value of assertions in an argument like this?

What, then, must be concluded as proved by the foregoing discussion with unbelievers?

In what cases would infidels admit the evidence of such testimony as we have been considering?

But what makes the case still stronger for Christianity?

II. PROPHECIES.

How is it proposed to treat the evidence from prophecy?

I. PARTIAL OBSCURITY IN THE PROPHECIES DOES NOT DESTROY THE PROOF OF FORESIGHT.

(1.) *The whole sense might not be understood.*

Why does not the obscurity of unfulfilled prophecies invalidate the proof afforded by fulfilled prophecies?

How is the absurdity of such an objection illustrated?

What, indeed, would be the only proper inference from obscure prophecies?

(2.) *The whole fulfilment might not be understood.*

How might common men be incapable of judging of fulfilled prophecies and yet be convinced of a divine foresight in them?

How might the same be true even of the most learned men?

What was the probable intention of the fulfilled prophecies?

II. PARTIAL INAPPLICABILITY IN THE PROPHECIES DOES NOT DESTROY THE PROOF OF FORESIGHT.

When a course of prophecy is applicable to a course of events, what is the fair inference? and how is this to be proved?

What objection does this principle refute?

(1.) *General Applicability in Human writings is a proof of their Intention.*

What two kinds of writing resemble prophecy in this respect?

How might one learn the intention of a fable or a parable, though the author had left it without a moral or application?

How might one learn the intention of a satire, though but partially acquainted with the persons or events intended? and what would be the measure of his satisfaction in reading it?

(2.) *General Applicability in the Prophecies is a Proof of their Intention.*

On the same principle may we prove the intention of the prophecies concerning the church, civil affairs, and the Messiah?

What further proof of their intention is afforded by the manner in which ancient Jews and modern Christians understand them?

III. OCCASIONAL MISAPPLICATION OF THE PROPHECIES, BY THE PROPHETS THEMSELVES OR THEIR INTERPRETERS, DOES NOT DESTROY THE PROOF OF DIVINE FORESIGHT.

If it could be shown that the prophets in their predictions thought of other events than those of which Christians now think, or that their predictions were applicable to other events than those to which Christians now apply them, what would be state of the argument?

(1.) *True Prophecies might be misapplied by the Prophets themselves.*

What illustration is used to show that the Scriptures might have other or further meaning than those persons had who first recited or wrote them?

How is the absurdity of the contrary view shown?

Why does the actual fulfilment of prophecies in a sense different from that of the prophets prove such fulfilment to have been divinely intended?

What, then, is the only question to be decided respecting prophecies, and what question respecting the prophets themselves may be left undecided?

(2.) *True Prophecies might be misapplied by their interpreters.*

In what case might it have availed an objector to prove that a prophecy was applicable to contemporary or previous events? and for what reason?

How is this illustrated by Porphyry's misapplication of the Book of Daniel?

Are the prophecies applicable to Christ and the Church capable of any other application? and if they were, how would this affect the question of divine foresight in them?

CONCLUSION. The Prophetical Evidence is of great weight when fairly considered.

What class of persons may hesitate to receive this prophetical evidence?

What moral qualifications are requisite in order to appreciate it?

What will be the temptation to the majority, and why is it vain to argue against their prejudices?

SECTION II. COLLATERAL EVIDENCE.

What is included under the general argument for the truth of Christianity?

How is this kind of evidence in regard to common matters estimated?

What two reasons are given for introducing it here?

What is the proposition asserted and to be proved in respect to the system of natural and revealed religion?

How can natural religion be said to be revealed?

I. GENERAL RELIGIOUS HISTORY IN SCRIPTURE, WITH ITS COLLATERAL EVIDENCE.

Why may revelation be considered as historical?

(I.) *General Religious History contained in Scripture.*

Thus considered, what is the general design of Scripture, as distinguished from all other books?

Consistently with this design, how does the Old Testament begin? and what purpose does this introduction serve with regard to Heathenism as well as the true revealed religion?

How does St. John, in like manner, begin his Gospel?

What, then, is the general character of the Scripture History?

How far does this general religious history include political or civil history?

In what light does revelation consider the common affairs of this world and its successive empires?

And yet what general account of its chief governments does it contain? during what period? and to what final condition of mankind?

2. *Collateral Evidence of this General History.*

What are the features of this history which, taken together, afford the largest scope for criticism?

From what sources might it, if spurious, be confuted?

Why does the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, taken in connection with the fact that it has hitherto survived all criticism, imply a positive argument for its truth?

How far must that fact be accepted as an actual proof of its truth?

Is it even pretended that it has ever been actually disproved?

II. PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS HISTORY CONTAINED IN SCRIPTURE. WITH ITS COLLATERAL EVIDENCE.

What does the Old Testament, as distinguishable from all common history, contain?

1. *Particular History contained in Scripture.*

(1.) *Of the Jewish Religion.*

What account does it give of the origin, progress, and peculiar position of a particular nation the Jews?

What conditional and absolute promises were made in it to this people?

What does it predict concerning the fulfillment of these promises? and what was the effect of these predictions upon the whole Jewish people?

And what does it further predict as to the reception of Messiah by the Jews, his consequent relation to the Gentiles, and the glory of his universal dominion?

(2.) *Of the Christian Religion.*

What account does it give of the appearance of Messiah, of his life, of the commission and credentials of his disciples, of the establishment and progress of Christianity, and of its prophets?

2. *Collateral Evidence of this History.*

What case is supposed in order to show the strength of the collateral evidence of this history?

(1.) *The Establishment of Natural Religion in the world is due to the Scriptures.*

How might this be shown to the supposed inquirer?

What place does divine revelation fill in the world's history? and what kind of a hearing does it consequently deserve?

If it is shown that the establishment of natural religion by revelation does not destroy the proof of it from reason?

(2.) *The Antiquity, Chronology, and Ethnology of Scripture are confirmed by tradition and modern science.*

By what external evidence are the first parts of Scripture confirmed?

(3.) *The Domestic History and Political History of Scripture are confirmed by Profane History as well as by their own inherent credibility.*

How far is the common Scripture history confirmed by profane history?

As distinguished from the miraculous or prophetic history of Scripture, how does it agree with profane history in representing the succession of events and of different ages and in the mode of delineating human characters?

What features in the narrative carry with them a presumption of veracity?

How may the strange incidents in Scripture be explained?

How may the mistakes of transcribers be accounted for?

What features in the extent and contents of this history heighten its appearance of truth?

How does this argument apply to the common history of the New Testament? and with what further external evidence?

And why does it give credibility also to its miraculous history?

(4.) *The Scripture account of the Jewish Nation is confirmed by their acknowledged history.*

What is an acknowledged matter of fact in respect to the antiquity and polity of the Jews? in respect to their religion? and in respect to the fundamental principle of their nationality?

How is it proved from their own history that such was the principle of their nationality, in distinction from that of surrounding nations?

Why does this remarkable preservation of natural religion among them render the miracles of Moses and the Prophets credible?

(5.) *The Messianic Prophecies of Scripture have been actually fulfilled in the rise of Christianity and decline of Judaism.*

What circumstances in the life of Jesus of Nazareth among the Jews would convince our supposed inquirer of the truth of the prophecies?

Upon what kind of evidence was he soon received by the Gentiles as the promised Messiah? and how is this evidence corroborated?

Upon what further internal evidence did Christianity spread through the world? in the face of what difficulties? and to what extent?

And, in the mean time, how have the history and present position of Judaism likewise fulfilled the prophecies?

How may some endeavor to account for the exclusive nationality of the Jews upon natural principles? and yet why does not this destroy the miraculous evidence it affords?

How is this illustrated by the fulfillment of prophecy at the birth of our Saviour?

(6.) *The Partial Fulfillment of the Scripture Prophecies affords reasonable presumption of their ultimate complete fulfillment.*

What is the presumption from the fulfilled prophecies as to those still unfulfilled?

How are the predicted restoration of the Jews and establishment of Christ's universal kingdom suggested and rendered probable by the past history of Judaism and Christianity?

What are the qualifications for thoroughly judging of this prophetic evidence? and to what conclusion have qualified judges come?

REVIEW AND ESTIMATE.

What are the several acknowledged facts, corroborative of Scripture, which have been put before our supposed inquirer?

What obvious appearances should he add to them?

What will be the proper effect of the whole argument upon his mind, and why cannot we as readily appreciate it?

I. THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES, SEPARATELY ESTIMATED, ARE OF ACKNOWLEDGED PROBABILITY.

What is required in order fully to estimate the foregoing evidences?

What matters of fact have been stated which must be acknowledged even by unbelievers?

If they object to the historical evidence of miracles as not sufficient to convince them, yet what cannot they deny?

If they attribute the fulfillment of prophecies to accident, yet what cannot they deny?

If they call the collateral evidences adduced mere fanciful coincidences, yet what must they admit in regard to the nature of such evidence and its actual effect in many cases?

II. THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES, COLLECTIVELY ESTIMATED, AFFORD CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY.

How are serious persons recommended to estimate these evidences? and what will be the result of such an estimate?

Why will this result follow?

III. THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES, PRACTICALLY ESTIMATED, ARE ON THE SIDE OF OUR BEST INTERESTS.

In comparing the evidence for and against Christianity, what practical consideration should be allowed?

Should such a consideration influence our judgment or our practice?

Why would it be inadmissible in simple questions of fact?

But in questions of conduct why should it be admitted?

IV. THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES, ESTIMATED LIKE COMMON EVIDENCES, WOULD BE CONCLUSIVE.

How are the truth of religion and of common matters to be alike estimated?

How is it shown that, in any common case, such collective evidence as that for Christianity would be conclusive?

V. THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES, WHEN NOT COLLECTIVELY ESTIMATED, ARE PECULIARLY EXPOSED TO MERE ARGUMENTATIVE OBJECTORS.

Why do assailants of these evidences, especially in conversation, greatly have the advantage?

VI. THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES, EVEN IF LESSENERD, CANNOT BE DESTROYED.

What has been shown hitherto in regard to a revelation in general and the Christian religion in particular, and what has now been shown in regard to the positive evidence for it?

THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.

(PART II. CHAP. VIII.)

Why is it needful and important to consider the objections to the analogical argument for religion?

What are the five objections to be considered?

To what are these plausible objections owing?

How will different classes be affected by them, and by the proposed answers to them?

1st Objection. THAT THIS ANALOGY ONLY SHIFTS THE DIFFICULTIES OF REVEALED RELIGION TO THE LOWER PLANE OF NATURAL RELIGION, WITHOUT DESTROYING THEM.

1. *The Objection may involve an absurd requirement.*

What is required in this objection, and to what may this requirement be equivalent?

2. *The Objection would hold equally against all inductive reasoning and common experience.*

What manner of arguing has always been allowed to be just?

Why is it not a poor thing to argue thus from natural religion to revealed?

How far would the same objection apply to common life, and what illustration is given?

3. *The Objection does not impair the logical value of the argument.*

(1.) *Mere sophistries are exposed.*

What unreasonable course is often pursued by objectors to revelation, and why is it important to expose the fallacy?

(2.) *Real objections are answered or mitigated.*

On what admission can objections to revealed religion be thus answered?

Without this admission, to what are the difficulties in the system and evidence of revealed religion analogous?

Upon what assumption alone does the argument for both natural and revealed religion rest, and by what analogy, therefore, is Christianity chiefly vindicated?

II. *Objection.* THAT THIS ANALOGY ONLY ENCUMBERS RELIGIOUS PRACTICE WITH THE LIKE DIFFICULTIES OF WORLDLY PRACTICE.

What is religion practically considered, and how may men be convinced of this?

1. *The objection is of no weight with fair minds.*

If there is any reason for seeking our temporal interest, what would prudence dictate as to our religious interest?

What makes the argument stronger for our religious interest than for our temporal interest?

What do fair minds consider in this question, and how are they disposed to act?

2. *The objection proceeds upon a groundless assumption.*

What is the thing assumed in this objection?

What is the general argument which it affords against the truth of religion?

By what analogy is this argument answered?

And why is this a sufficient answer?

By what two methods can this answer be shown to be just and conclusive?

III. *Objection.* THAT THIS ANALOGY ONLY MERGES THE MYSTERY OF PROVIDENCE IN THE MYSTERY OF NATURE, WITHOUT VINDICATING ITS WISDOM AND JUSTICE.

What is the proper subject of this treatise? from what other related subject is it distinguishable? and in which of the two are we most concerned?

1. *Such objections have been answered as far as necessary.*

How far is it necessary to justify Providence against such objections?

What is the argument by which such objections have been answered?

2. *Such objections have been answered, not by merely putting them, but by exhibiting the things objected against as credible matters of fact.*

What has been the mode of argument by which such objections have been removed?

How have the things objected against been shown to be credible? and what example is recalled?

3. *Such objections, even if not answered, would be utterly inconclusive against these established facts of religion.*

What future fact of religion is cited as having been established in spite of all such objections, and by what argument?

Why are necessitarian objections against that fact inconclusive?

4. *Such objections, though they may concern the reasonableness of religion, do not enter into the question of its credibility.*

Why may objections against the credibility of religion be met without inquiring into its reasonableness?

What is the perfection of religion as defined by St. John?

What part of religion, however, may be shown to be reasonable? and how may this be shown?

5. *Such objections, though not answered by analogy, may yet be destroyed as to their animus or intention.*

To what objections is analogy confessedly no immediate answer?

But to what aim or intention of these objections is it an immediate answer?

IV. *Objection.* THAT THIS ANALOGY LEAVES THE MIND IN AN UNSATISFIED STATE.

What is acknowledged in regard to this treatise, and by what argument is this objection to be met?

1. *Satisfactory Evidence does not belong to the condition of man.*

How are men divided in their opinions concerning life?

Is it easy to settle the question speculatively?

How is it settled actually to our hands?

But what considerations show the evidence upon which it is thus settled be far from satisfactory?

To what extent is that evidence unsatisfactory? and yet how do men act under it?

2. *Satisfactory Evidence does not belong to the nature of religion.*

What does religion presuppose in those who will embrace it?

How is this illustrated?

What, then, is, and what is not, the question as to the evidence of religion?

If it were sufficient for mere curiosity, would it answer as well for the purposes of probation?

3. *Satisfactory Evidence is afforded for all practical purposes.*

What is, and what is not, strictly speaking, the practical question in common matters?

What evidence may determine an action to be prudent, besides the satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness?

V. *Objection.* THAT THIS ANALOGY IS NOT LIKELY TO BE INFLUENTIAL UPON MEN'S BELIEF AND PRACTICE.

What two considerations, before mentioned, show this objection to be nothing to the point?

1. *The objection is not relevant to the purpose of this treatise.*

What is, and what is not the purpose of this treatise?

Where lies the responsibility for the little influence of the evidence of religion upon men.

2. *The objection does not affect the ends of religion or of Providence.*

How are the ends of religion still accomplished? And, the designs of Providence?

3. *The objection allows enough to justify the foregoing argument.*

What is allowed by the very terms of the objection as to the whole argument, and why therefore should it be laid before men?

GENERAL ANSWER TO THE WHOLE OF THE FOREGOING OBJECTIONS.

[NOTE. What distinction does Butler make between arguing *upon* and arguing *from* the principles of others, and what illustration is given?]

1. *This Analogy is only objectionable in so far as it has proceeded upon the principles of others.*

What reason does Butler give for having argued upon the principles of others rather than his own?

What principle of others has been hitherto admitted, and what principle of his own has been omitted?

How is this latter principle illustrated as applied to God?

What shows the principles of liberty and moral fitness to be true?

How has the omission of them affected the very style of this treatise?

2. *This Analogy is wholly unobjectionable considered as a reasoning from facts rather than from principles.*

These two abstract principles being omitted, in what light only can religion be considered?

Why are Christianity and the proof of it both matter of fact?

Why is even natural religion a matter of fact?

(1.) *Mathematical illustration of this distinction.*

What illustration is used to explain this distinction between the facts of religion and its abstract principles?

In this illustration, which is the more credible, the fact or the abstract truth, and why must the worst sceptics admit this?

(2.) *Exemplification of this distinction in Religion.*

In the doctrine of the divine government of the world what is the abstract truth asserted?

If this abstract truth were now to become positive matter of fact, what questions would remain as perplexing as ever?

In that case what would be the proof of God's moral Government and how would that proof be affected by such abstract questions?

Upon what then does the assertion of a future perfect moral government rest, and is it the assertion of a mere abstract truth or of a fact?

In the proof of this future fact, what argument has been pursued, and what are its peculiar strength and weakness?

3. *This Analogy is therefore at once an unanswerable proof of the facts of religion and an incidental confirmation of its principles.*

What will be the force of the treatise respectively upon those who admit the principles of liberty and moral fitness and upon those who do not admit them?

What will be its force upon Christians and upon Infidels?

What is it in religion that makes the analogical argument for it superior to all ridicule?

And what class ought particularly to appreciate this argument?

C O N C L U S I O N .

(PART II.)

I. SCOPE OF THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENT:—

1. *As enforcing the Peculiar Evidences of Revealed Religion.*

How are the evidences of Natural Religion increased in Christian countries, and why is scepticism there so remarkable?

What is the value of abstruse reasonings respecting the truths of Natural Religion? and how are they intuitively manifest to unprejudiced minds?

How do truths of Revealed Religion differ from those of Natural Religion in this respect?

Why does inattention to the former imply the same immoral temper as inattention to the latter?

What is the nature of our obligation to attend to revelation?

* How do its evidence and manifest appearance enforce this obligation?

How does its miraculous character give peculiar force to this obligation?

What, therefore, is the degree of this obligation?

2. *As adapted to all classes of Sceptics.*

† What sort of men may be supposed to have met this obligation?

On what principles do some of them reject all religion? and to what practical extremes do they carry their neglect of it?

On what supposed principles do others, not chargeable with such profligateness, oppose religion?

How do they estimate its evidence comparatively?

What two classes of objections are they likely to bring forward?

What peculiar objections do they bring against Christianity?

How do they fortify themselves against its evidence?

Or if they partially admit its evidence, how do they behave under it?

II. SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENT:—

1. *In respect to the System of Christianity.*

What has been proved in respect to religion considered as revealed and miraculous?

What, in respect to the relations between reason and revelation?

What is the argument for the wisdom and goodness of the Christian system.

How has it been shown that the tardy and intricate method of the Christian system is no objection against it?

What are the heads of analogical proof in favor of the doctrine of a Mediâtor?

2. *In respect to the Evidence of Christianity.*

What objections against the Christian Evidences have been considered? and how have those objections been answered?

What positive evidences have been adduced and how have they been analogically supported?

III. PRACTICAL INFERENCES FROM THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENT.

What deductions, and what principles may be allowed, in practically applying the previous argument?

1. *That Immorality is greatly aggravated in persons acquainted with Christianity.*

Why is immorality greatly aggravated in any who knowingly reject Christianity?

2. *That Scepticism does not relax the claims of Christianity.*

What middle state of mind may exist with regard to Christianity?

What class of sceptics are supposed to be in this state of mind?

What two reasons are given why we cannot include in this class all who have ever heard of Christianity?

How far are such sceptics under the obligation of Christianity?

3. *That Blasphemy with regard to Christianity is absolutely without excuse.*

What is the only temptation to such blasphemy? and why do such temptations afford no excuse?

What degree of obduracy and unbelief does it argue?





